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 Remands by Deception 
William M. Janssen* 
INTRODUCTION 
“[R]ecurring, decades-old, hand-to-hand combat.”1  That is how one cir-
cuit judge described removal-and-remand litigation fights in federal court. 
It is a characterization apt in both fact and metaphor.  In point of fact, 
the fights that mark removal-and-remand litigation contests are often pitched 
ones: frequently intense, expensive, and prolonged.2  They have been that 
way for many years.3  Faithful to the military metaphor, these fights can be 
indisputably decisive and terribly wasteful.  They are contests to decide the 
place of battle, and as military strategists have conspired for millennia, choos-
 
* This Article evolved from a chapter prepared for the non-profit, non-partisan Food 
and Drug Law Institute (“FDLI”), and I thank the FDLI and text editor Gregory J. 
Wartman for that opportunity.  I am also especially thankful to Professors Kevin M. 
Clermont, Richard D. Freer, and A. Benjamin Spencer for their kind generosity in 
sharing suggestions that enriched this Article, and to Morgan L. Ivey and Bijan 
Khaladj-Ghom for their hours of patient, relentless, and invaluable research assis-
tance. 
 1. Barlow v. Colgate Palmolive Co., 772 F.3d 1001, 1015 (4th Cir. 2014) (Da-
vis, J., dissenting). 
 2. See James E. Pfander, Collateral Review of Remand Orders: Reasserting the 
Supervisory Role of the Supreme Court, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 493, 518 (2011) (“[T]he 
removal of cases from state to federal court occurs with numbing regularity today, 
predictably triggering motions to remand.”); Michael E. Solimine, Removal, Re-
mands, and Reforming Federal Appellate Review, 58 MO. L. REV. 287, 289 & nn.13, 
15 (1993) (noting that data compiled from 1980 through 1990 by the Administrative 
Office of the United States Courts confirmed that approximately eleven percent of the 
federal trial court civil docket was comprised of removed cases, and other studies 
showed that approximately fifteen percent of all removed cases were remanded back 
to state court).  See generally Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Exorcising 
the Evil of Forum-Shopping, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1507, 1507 (1995) (“Most of the 
business of litigation comprises pretrial disputes.  A common and important dispute is 
over where adjudication should take place.”). 
 3. See, e.g., Knapp v. W. Vt. R.R. Co., 87 U.S. 117, 121–24 (1873) (notwith-
standing a full hearing and judgment by the federal trial court and the intervening 
death of one of the plaintiffs, judgment reversed by the U.S. Supreme Court for im-
proper removal with directions to remand to the state court in Vermont for further 
proceedings).  See generally Urtetiqui v. D’Arcy, 34 U.S. 692, 701–02 (1835) (“But 
there can be no doubt, that the United States court had a right to examine and decide 
for itself upon the grounds on which D’Arbel claimed to have his cause removed into 
the United States court.  That court had a right to decide upon its own jurisdiction and 
remand the cause, if sufficient grounds for a removal were not shown.”). 
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ing wisely the place of battle can often foretell the outcome of the fight.4  On 
the other hand, they have the potential, like all combat engagements, to lan-
guish on interminably for months (or years)5 with little claimed ground to 
show as a prize.6  From either perspective, this much is certain: removal-and-
remand litigation is usually only the precursor to the merits, not the main 
event.  The substantive merits fight will still lie waiting a resolution either in 
a courtroom or over a negotiating table. 
Because removal-and-remand litigation nearly always postpones the ul-
timate resolution of the underlying merits dispute, Congress long worried 
over the mischief this costly, delaying, collateral litigation could wreak on 
both the federal and state judicial systems (and on federalism more general-
ly).7  To contain that mischief, Congress devised a mechanism to bring a 
swift and decisive close to such satellite litigation: it invested the federal trial 
judges with generally unreviewable autonomy in making remand decisions.  
Under Congress’s approach, the federal trial judges’ decisions on remand 
were to be made by them, and by them only once; and then once made, those 
decisions were to be final – as to both the deciding judges who issued them 
and to all appellate tribunals thereafter.8  This plan, Congress devised, would 
 
 4. See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Realities, 88 
CORNELL L. REV. 119, 121 (2002) [hereinafter Clermont & Eisenberg, Litigation 
Realities] (“Forum is worth fighting over because outcome often turns on forum . . . .  
When the dust settles, the case does too--but on terms that reflect the results of the 
skirmishing.  Thus, the fight over forum can often be the critical dispute in the 
case.”).  See generally ROBERT L. CANTRELL, UNDERSTANDING SUN TZU ON THE ART 
OF WAR 78 (2003) (“If your enemy . . . has superior strength, evade him. . . .  Attack 
your enemy where he is unprepared, appear where he does not expect you.”). 
 5. See Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust, 547 U.S. 633, 640 (2006) (noting the 
“nearly three years of jurisdictional advocacy in the cases before us” that validated 
Congress’s fears of prolonged removal/remand litigation); id. at 650 (Scalia, J., con-
curring) (“The remand orders in these cases date back to early 2004; over two years 
later, federal courts are still engaged in appellate review.”). 
 6. Consider, for example, a Battle of the Somme analogy.  The Battle of 
Somme was fought from July 1 to mid-November 1916, during which forces from 
Britain and France advanced a negligible five miles after suffering more than 600,000 
casualties and inflicting nearly 650,000 casualties on their German adversaries.  Bat-
tle of the Somme: 1 July – 13 November 1916, BBC, http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/
worldwars/wwone/battle_somme.shtml (last visited Jan. 2, 2016). 
 7. See Thermtron Prods., Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336, 354–55 (1976) 
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (noting that Congress “obviously thought it equally im-
portant that when removal to a federal court is not warranted the case should be re-
turned to the state court as expeditiously as possible”); Ellenburg v. Spartan Motor 
Chassis, Inc., 519 F.3d 192, 196 (4th Cir. 2008) (“The important policy carried in this 
provision disfavors prolonged interruptions to litigation created by litigating which of 
two otherwise legitimate courts should resolve the disputes between the parties.”). 
 8. See In re La Providencia Dev. Corp., 406 F.2d 251, 253 (1st Cir. 1969) (“The 
district court has one shot, right or wrong.”).  See also Ex parte Pa. Co., 137 U.S. 451, 
454 (1890) (“[I]t was the intention of Congress to make the judgment of the circuit 
court [now, district courts] remanding a cause to the state court final and conclu-
2
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at least eliminate the specter of collateral appellate litigation over remand 
decisions grinding on interminably.9  The Judiciary Code announces this plan 
crisply – remand orders are “not reviewable on appeal or otherwise,”10 except 
in very few, narrow exceptions.11  Such has been “the established rule . . . 
stretching back to 1887,” when Congress first installed this no-review di-
rective.12  By 1946, the conclusiveness of this directive was so well settled 
that the U.S. Supreme Court declared it “no longer open to doubt.”13 
But what if the trial judge’s decision to grant the remand was premised 
on a lie?  Not a non-partisan lie, mind you, but a litigant’s lie.  And not some 
grey-area, stretching-of-the-truth, overly aggressive, leaping misstep in advo-
cacy, but a genuine fabrication.  A bald, bold-faced falsehood, calculated 
deliberately to deceive the federal judge into a factual conclusion that the 
litigant invented intentionally to spur the court into signing a remand order. 
What then? 
Congress directs that there be no remand reviews; indeed, Congress 
“unmistakably commands” it.14  Does that proscription apply to deceptively-
induced remand orders?  Or may a hoodwinked judiciary rescind its fraudu-
lently produced (and otherwise “unreviewable”) remand and deny the miscre-
ants their state-forum booty? 
This Article explores that conundrum.  Part I introduces the preliminar-
ies of removal, remand, and Congress’s no-review directive, supplying an 
orientation to the background of these concepts, their purpose, and their oper-
ation.  Part II discusses the only appellate resolution to have ever squarely 
confronted this question, the Fourth Circuit’s opinions in Barlow v. Colgate 
Palmolive Co.15  Part III conducts the statutory analysis to evaluate whether 
 
sive.”).  See generally Thermtron Prods., Inc., 423 U.S. at 355 (Rehnquist, J., dissent-
ing) (observing that Congress “made the district courts the final arbiters of whether 
Congress intended that specific actions were to be tried in a federal court”). 
 9. See United States v. Rice, 327 U.S. 742, 751 (1946) (intending to avoid a 
“prolonged litigation of questions of jurisdiction of the district court to which the 
cause is removed”); Ex parte Pa. Co., 137 U.S. at 454 (prohibition aspired “to con-
tract the jurisdiction of the federal courts”). 
 10. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (2012).  See Three J Farms, Inc. v. Alton Box Bd. Co., 
609 F.2d 112, 115 (4th Cir. 1979) (“Unquestionably, the statute not only forecloses 
appellate review, but also bars reconsideration of such an order by the district 
court.”). 
 11. See, e.g., In re Blackwater Sec. Consulting, LLC, 460 F.3d 576, 582–83 (4th 
Cir. 2006); Aquamar S.A. v. Del Monte Fresh Produce N.A., Inc., 179 F.3d 1279, 
1285–86 (11th Cir. 1999).  See generally S. Vance Wittie, Appealing Remand Orders, 
22 APP. ADVOC. 111 (2009) (surveying statutory and judicial exceptions). 
 12. Thermtron Prods., Inc., 423 U.S. at 343.  See In re Lowe, 102 F.3d 731, 734 
(4th Cir. 1996) (“The general rule prohibiting review of remand orders has been a part 
of American jurisprudence for at least a century.”). 
 13. Rice, 327 U.S. at 751. 
 14. Gravitt v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 430 U.S. 723, 723 (1977) (per curiam). 
 15. 772 F.3d 1001 (4th Cir. 2014) (en banc), vacating and replacing 750 F.3d 
437, 442 (4th Cir. 2014) (2-1 panel opinion). 
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Congress has indeed enacted a statute that actually forestalls the federal judi-
ciary’s ability to protect itself against fraud in the remand process.  After 
exploring the nuances of the statute’s language, the guide of “ordinary mean-
ing,” and the lessons of congressional intent, this Article concludes that, not-
withstanding the seemingly absolutist, prohibitory language of Congress’s 
no-review statute, deceptively-induced remands can be vacated by the courts.  
Part IV considers the potential impacts of such a conclusion and finds that a 
robust, longstanding body of existing law serves to ensure stability and pre-
dictability in this use of the vacatur power. 
I.  PRELIMINARIES: REMOVAL, REMAND, AND THE NO-REVIEW 
DIRECTIVE 
In the law, as in life, “[c]ontext matters.”16  On its face, the no-review 
directive expresses a seemingly unrelenting legislative preference for a one-
judge, single-ruling treatment of remand motions.  But because context mat-
ters, the no-review directive must be understood in its procedural environ-
ment.  To truly “give meaningful effect to the intent of the enacting legisla-
ture, [courts] must interpret statutory text with reference to the statute’s pur-
pose and its history.”17  So, to preliminaries this Article now turns and, more 
specifically, to the context of federal removal, remand, and Congress’s no-
review statutory directive. 
A.  Removal to Federal Court 
The foundational objective of the federal removal statute is easily un-
derstood by a metaphor – a horse tale.  The Baltimore Colts professional 
football club played their home games in “the world’s largest outdoor insane 
asylum.”18  Actually, the facility’s official name was Memorial Stadium (so 
named to honor the City of Baltimore’s deceased World War I and World 
War II soldiers),19 but the nickname proved a fitting one.  The team was the 
first with cheerleaders, the first with a mascot (“Dixie” the colt), the first with 
nattily logo-emblazoned helmets, and the first with fan clubs; Baltimore’s 
franchise also sported a dazzling marching band, packed the golden arm of 
future Hall-of-Fame quarterback Johnny Unitas, galvanized the nation in 
1958 with their sudden-death overtime win in the “greatest game ever 
played,” and hoisted three championship trophies to measure out their seven-
 
 16. United States v. Ressam, 553 U.S. 272, 283 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 17. Id. 
 18. See Michael Gibbons, Baltimore Colts: A Team For The Ages, 
MONUMENTAL NETWORK – PRESSBOX BALT. (Sept. 5, 2006), http://www.pressbox
online.com/story/id/727. 
 19. See Memorial Stadium, BALLPARKS BASEBALL, http://www.ballparksof
baseball.com/past/MemorialStadium.htm (last visited Jan. 17, 2016). 
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teen post-season appearances.20  Truly, the Colts and the City of Baltimore 
had something very special together.  As one columnist reminisced, “The 
love affair between the team and its fans was all-consuming and pristine, 
exuding the kind of passion that can come only once in the sports-life of a 
city.”21  Little surprise, then, that the divorce was bitter and ugly. 
After years of unfruitful talks to coax Baltimore into building a modern 
facility to replace the aging Memorial Stadium, the Colts’ owner, Robert Ir-
say, opened negotiations with other cities to explore a possible relocation of 
the team.22  When those talks turned ominous, the Maryland legislature re-
sponded by authorizing the forcible seizure of the team by eminent domain.23  
The night before the government could finish up its eminent domain authori-
zation, the Colts’ owner arranged for a fleet of moving vans to slip into the 
old stadium at 2:00 a.m. to decamp the team, all its possessions, and its leg-
endary horseshoe logo out of the city under cover of darkness.24  Morning 
broke to an empty Memorial Stadium and an enraged, heartbroken city.25 
 
 20. See Gibbons, supra note 18. 
 21. See id. 
 22. See E.M. Swift, Now You See Him, Now You Don’t, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED 
(Dec. 15, 1986), http://www.si.com/vault/1986/12/15/106777270/now-you-see-him-
now-you-dont.  
 23. See Mayor of Balt. v. Balt. Football Club Inc., 624 F. Supp. 278, 280–81 (D. 
Md. 1985). 
 24. See Phillip B. Wilson, Thirty Years Later, Remembering How Colts’ Move 
Went Down, USA TODAY (Mar. 29, 2014, 12:50 PM), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/nfl/colts/2014/03/29/indianapolis-baltimore-
move-30-year-anniversary-mayflower/7053553/. .  The stratagems would have made 
Tom Clancy envious: 
 
All fifteen moving trucks took a different route to Indianapolis from Balti-
more, done as a diversion tactic so the Maryland State Police could not en-
force the eminent domain law that had just been signed (which they would 
have been able to act upon once it took effect to force the Colts back to Balti-
more).  Once a truck got to Indiana, the Indiana State Police would meet it and 
escort it to Indianapolis—a process repeated until all fifteen vans had reached 
the destination. 
 
See Baltimore Colts Relocation to Indianapolis, WIKIPEDIA, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Baltimore_Colts_relocation_to_Indianapolis (last modi-
fied Jan. 14, 2016).  Or maybe it wasn’t actually fifteen moving vans.  See Candus 
Thomson, Colts Leave Town: Getting the Story Straight, BALT. SUN (Mar. 29, 2009), 
http://www.baltimoresun.com/sports/ravens/bal-sp.coltsmyths29mar29-story.html 
(“Now, 25 years later, the details are a little hazy.  So we turn to the writings of the 
major news giants of our generation. . . .  Out of the darkness and into the training 
complex in Owings Mills rumbled ‘a Mayflower moving van’ (WBAL), ‘11 vans’ 
(Globe), ‘12 moving vans’ (The New York Times), ‘15 vans’ (The Sun), ‘a fleet’ 
(The Boston Globe), ‘a caravan’ (The Washington Post).”). 
 25. See Baltimore Sun Readers Recall the Colts’ Move to Indianapolis, BALT. 
SUN (Mar. 27, 2009), http://www.baltimoresun.com/sports/baltimore-colts/bal-colts
5
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The following day, the City of Baltimore leapt into action, filing a peti-
tion to condemn the Colts and thereupon to restrain the team from transfer-
ring assets away from Baltimore.26  The tribunal selected to hear this petition 
was a predictable one – the local Circuit Court of Baltimore County – where 
the petition received a homey reception: the Circuit Judge issued an injunc-
tion, lickety-split, to forbid the Colts’ relocation from Maryland.27  But leav-
ing the dispute in a Baltimore County state court, to be heard by a Baltimore 
County state judge, was not what the Colts organization had in mind.  They 
promptly filed their notice to remove the case to federal court (invoking di-
versity jurisdiction, claiming the team was now a citizen of the state of Indi-
ana).28  Unmoved and insistent on the cozy local tribunal they had selected 
originally, the City of Baltimore fought back with a swift motion for re-
mand.29  The desired remand, however, would never come.30  The condemna-
tion lawsuit had left the local Baltimore County state court for good; it would 
remain in the federal system.31 
 
memories0329-story.html (Fans had various reactions: “a big part of my life was 
gone[;]” “shell shocked[;]” “I wanted to blow the tires out on the Mayflower vans[;]” 
“My grandmother wept and my grandfather fumed as I sat there feeling sad for them, 
knowing something they loved so much was on its way out of town[;]” “I was sad, 
hurt, felt betrayed.  Like a girlfriend telling you: ‘We need to see other people.’”).  It 
is a city’s shared pain that never fully healed.  Phillip P. Wilson, Colts’ Move Still 
Stings for Some in Baltimore, USA TODAY (Jan. 4, 2013, 10:38 PM), http://www.
usatoday.com/story/sports/nfl/2013/01/04/indianapolis-colts-move-baltimore-bitter-
feelings/1810527/ (One sports journalist said: “We hated Irsay.  We hated Indianapo-
lis.  We hated (former Indianapolis mayor Bill) Hudnut.  Together, we hated them.  
There’s no two ways about it.  They took something away from us that belonged to us 
and they had no right to do that.  No right at all. . . .  The scar will always be there.  
The wound has healed, but the scar will always be there and you can’t erase history of 
what was done to us.”). 
 26. See Mayor of Balt., 624 F. Supp. at 280–81. 
 27. Id. at 281. 
 28. See Colts Case Going to Federal Courts, N.Y. TIMES (June 23, 1984), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1984/06/23/sports/colts-case-going-to-federal-courts.html 
(“A Federal judge decided today that the city’s lawsuit to return the Colts from Indi-
anapolis should be heard in the Federal courts rather than in the Maryland court sys-
tem.”). 
 29. See Mayor of Balt., 624 F. Supp. at 280–81. 
 30. See id. at 281 (The federal trial judge ruled that, “for purposes of diversity 
jurisdiction, the Colts’ principal place of business [after the moving vans departed] . . 
. was ‘not in Maryland.’”). 
 31. Id.  Nearly two years later, the City of Baltimore and the Colts settled their 
fight, dismissing all then-pending litigation with, among other terms, a Colts pledge 
to support Baltimore’s acquisition of a new NFL franchise.  See Barry Temkin, Colts, 
Baltimore Settle Differences, CHI. TRIB. (Mar. 18, 1986), http://articles.chicago
tribune.com/1986-03-18/sports/8601200613_1_colts-glory-colts-owner-robert-irsay-
colts-training-facility.  In one of sports’ great historic ironies, the Baltimore fans 
would claim a new franchise for their heartbroken city by breaking the hearts of the 
Cleveland Browns’ faithful when they succeeded in inducing the Browns to relocate 
6
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The power to remove a pending state lawsuit to federal court is an au-
thority steeped in American civil practice tradition.  Although a settled fea-
ture in federal jurisdiction since the time of the Judiciary Act of 1789,32 the 
right of removal to federal court is not enshrined in the Constitution, nor did 
it have a comparable ancestor at English common law.33  Nevertheless, its 
constitutionality “has long since passed beyond doubt.”34 
The removal authority is congressionally sanctioned forum-shopping.35  
But it is more than that; it is forum-shopping in litigations where forum-
shopping is most highly valued by all the litigants, since both sides have tried 
 
to Baltimore, where they set up shop as the “Baltimore Ravens.”  See Charles Babing-
ton & Ken Denlinger, Modell Announces Browns’ Move to Baltimore, WASH. POST 
(Nov. 7, 1995), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/sports/longterm/memories/
1995/95nfl4.htm. 
 32. Ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 73, 79 (1789) (“That if a suit be commenced in any state 
court against an alien, or by a citizen of the state in which the suit is brought against a 
citizen of another state, and the matter in dispute exceeds the aforesaid sum or value 
of five hundred dollars, exclusive of costs, . . . and the defendant shall, at the time of 
entering his appearance in such state court, file a petition for the removal of the cause 
for trial into the next circuit court, . . . it shall then be the duty of the state court to . . . 
proceed no further in the cause, and . . . the cause shall proceed [in federal court] in 
the same manner as if it had been brought there by original process.”).  Following its 
approval by the U.S. Senate by a vote of 14–6 and assent by the U.S. House of Repre-
sentatives without a roll call vote, President George Washington signed the Act into 
law on September 24, 1789.  See Primary Documents in American History – Judici-
ary Act of 1789, LIBR. CONGRESS (last visited Jan. 17, 2016), http://www.loc.gov/
rr/program/bib/ourdocs/judiciary.html.  See also Thermtron Prods., Inc. v. Hermans-
dorfer, 423 U.S. 336, 344 (1976) (“Removal of cases from state courts has been al-
lowed since the first Judiciary Act . . . .”). 
 33. See 14B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 3721, at 3–4 (4th ed. 2009). 
 34. Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257, 265 (1879) (Justice Strong pronouncing 
this dismissive characterization: “The constitutional right of Congress to authorize the 
removal before trial of civil cases arising under the laws of the United States has long 
since passed beyond doubt.  It was exercised almost contemporaneously with the 
adoption of the Constitution, and the power has been in constant use ever since.”).  
The Court set the matter to rest decidedly in 1871.  See Ry. Co. v. Whitton’s Adm’r, 
80 U.S. 270, 288 (1871) (“The judicial power of the United States extends by the 
Constitution to controversies between citizens of different States as well as to cases 
arising under the Constitution, treaties, and laws of the United States, and the manner 
and conditions upon which that power shall be exercised, except as the original or 
appellate character of the jurisdiction is specially designated in the Constitution, are 
mere matters of legislative discretion.”). 
 35. See Adam R. Prescott, Note, On Removal Jurisdiction’s Unanimous Consent 
Requirement, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 235, 255 (2011) (footnotes omitted) (“Re-
moval is, at its core, an exercise in forum shopping.  The defendant attempts either to 
avoid a specific state court that is suspected to be plaintiff-friendly or to end litigation 
that has begun unfavorably in a state tribunal.”).  See generally RICHARD D. FREER, 
CIVIL PROCEDURE 222 (2d ed. 2009) (“Removal is a remarkable procedure that gives 
the defendant, sued in state court, the right to ‘remove’ the case to federal court.”). 
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to do it.36  Removal was almost certainly intended by Congress as a shield to 
protect against local “State attachments and State prejudices” which “might 
affect injuriously the regular administration of justice in the State courts.”37  
The shield was available to plaintiffs, “in the first instance[, through their] . . . 
election of courts before suit brought” and, correspondingly, “where the suit 
was commenced in a State court a like election to the defendant after-
wards.”38  Through removal, the defendant unseats the various tactical ad-
vantages that the plaintiff so highly prized in preferring a state tribunal, when 
a federal tribunal was otherwise available.39  That objective was undoubtedly 
in mind when the “Indianapolis” Colts chose to remove to federal court to 
 
 36. See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Do Case Outcomes Really 
Reveal Anything About the Legal System? Win Rates and Removal Jurisdiction, 83 
CORNELL L. REV. 581, 598 (1998) [hereinafter Clermont & Eisenberg, Win Rates and 
Removal Jurisdiction]. 
 37. See Ry. Co., 80 U.S. at 289.   See generally WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 33, at 
3 (“[T]he original right to remove probably was designed to protect nonresidents from 
the local prejudices of state courts.”); Solimine, supra note 2, at 290 n.16 (citing 
PAUL M. BATOR ET AL., HART & WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE 
FEDERAL SYSTEM 1767 (3d ed. 1988)) (“Historically, passage of the removal statutes 
appears to have been largely motivated by the perceived need for a federal forum (in 
the face of a hostile state forum) for at least certain types of cases.”).  In the related 
context of Congress’s purpose of devising escape of any type to a federal forum, 
Justice Story offered:  
 
The constitution has presumed (whether rightly or wrongly we do not inquire) 
that state attachments, state prejudices, state jealousies, and state interests, might 
some times obstruct, or control, or be supposed to obstruct or control, the regular 
administration of justice.  Hence, in controversies [authorized by Article III] . . . 
it enables the parties, under the authority of congress, to have the controversies 
heard, tried, and determined before the national tribunals. 
 
Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. 304, 347 (1816).  See also id. (“In respect to the 
other enumerated cases—the cases arising under the constitution, laws, and treaties of 
the United States, cases affecting ambassadors and other public ministers, and cases 
of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction—reasons of a higher and more extensive na-
ture, touching the safety, peace, and sovereignty of the nation, might well justify a 
grant of exclusive jurisdiction.”). 
 38. Ry. Co., 80 U.S. at 289.  See generally Clermont & Eisenberg, Win Rates and 
Removal Jurisdiction, supra note 36, at 592 (footnote omitted) (“[I]n diversity cases, 
a plaintiff suing in state court typically chooses that court to maximize its advantage.  
Removal jurisdiction allows the out-of-state defendant to remove the case from the 
presumably more biased state forum chosen by the plaintiff to a more neutral federal 
forum.”). 
 39. See Clermont & Eisenberg, Win Rates and Removal Jurisdiction, supra note 
36, at 598 (“By removal, the defendant defeats the plaintiff’s forum advantage, induc-
ing such changes as dislodging the plaintiff’s lawyer from a familiar and favored 
forum, and more generally reversing the various biases, costs and other kinds of in-
conveniences, disparities in court quality, and differences in procedural law that led 
the plaintiff to prefer state court.”). 
8
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escape a hometown judiciary they feared was comprised of angry football 
fans and a jury pool surging with blue-and-white season ticketholder loyal-
ists.  This very same motivation, grounded in similar fears of hometown prej-
udices, attachments, and predilections, often (if not always) has been motivat-
ing removals from state courts throughout the two-and-a-quarter centuries 
that have followed since 1789.40 
The removal power is a potent one.  With nary a motion nor any judicial 
officer’s blessing, a litigant may summarily and instantly terminate a state 
court judge’s right to continue to preside over a properly begun state court 
lawsuit by the simple expedient of filing – unilaterally – a “notice” of remov-
al.41  Careful research tends to verify that removal matters, and significantly 
so.42  One empirical study concluded that a plaintiff’s likelihood of victory in 
a removed diversity case (thirty-four percent chance) is greatly lessened from 
a diversity case where that plaintiff filed originally in federal court (seventy-
one percent).43  As a matter of procedural principle, this data is hardly sur-
prising.  After all, “Removal jurisdiction is supposed to affect outcome”;44 
that is, in fact, why Congress enacted the right in the first place.45  If forum 
didn’t truly matter, there would have been no reason to enact a law empower-
ing a party to change it.  Because forum matters so meaningfully, the pitched 
fight the City of Baltimore and the Baltimore (er, “Indianapolis”) Colts 
fought over where to litigate the team’s location is easy to appreciate.  Ergo, 
as two leading empirical study scholars aptly concluded from all their careful 
data analysis: “The name of the game indeed is forum-shopping, and so all 
those lawyers out there are not wasting their clients’ money on forum 
fights.”46 
 
 40. See generally id. at 602 (“Although the parties clearly think that forum mat-
ters, in fact, forum--with all its implications of bias and inconvenience shifted in favor 
of defendants--may matter even more than they believe.”). 
 41. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(d) (2012) (“Promptly after the filing” of a notice of 
removal, defendants “shall file a copy of the notice with the clerk of [the] State court, 
which shall effect the removal and the State court shall proceed no further unless and 
until the case is remanded.”).  See generally Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co., LLC 
v. Owens, 135 S. Ct. 547, 549–50 (2014). 
 42. Clermont & Eisenberg, Win Rates and Removal Jurisdiction, supra note 36, 
at 601–02. 
 43. Id. at 581, 584 (“The shift from a favorable forum, chosen by plaintiffs, to a 
less favorable forum, chosen by defendants, drives down plaintiffs’ win rates.”).  See 
also Thomas C. Goodhue, Note, Appellate Review of Remand Orders: A Substan-
tive/Jurisdictional Conundrum, 91 IOWA L. REV. 1319, 1323 (2006) (“By removing a 
case to federal court, defendants can change judges, potential biases, and rules of 
procedure; and removing a case might improve a defendant’s chances of victory.”). 
 44. Clermont & Eisenberg, Win Rates and Removal Jurisdiction, supra note 36, 
at 592. 
 45. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 33, at 2–3. 
 46. Clermont & Eisenberg, Litigation Realities, supra note 4, at 124. 
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Once removed to federal court, a lawsuit will remain there, unless it be 
remanded back to the state court.47 
B.  Remand Back to State Court 
The federal courts are charged strictly with the duty to exercise the ju-
risdiction that Congress has conferred upon them.48  True since the early days 
of the federal judiciary, the national courts “have no more right to decline the 
exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not giv-
en.”49  But equally true, the removal authority conferred by Congress is to be 
“strictly construed,” that “[d]ue regard for the rightful independence of state 
governments . . . requires that [federal courts] scrupulously confine their own 
jurisdiction to the precise limits which the statute has defined.”50  Congress 
supplied that definition in several places; the Supreme Court has inferred it in 
others.  Both mark litigation circumstances where continued federal jurisdic-
tion ceases51 and where remand is obligatory, either because it is squarely 
forbidden or because of the trial court’s exercise of its discretion.52 
First, a remand is mandatory if federal subject-matter jurisdiction is ab-
sent.53  This, of course, is axiomatic – federal subject-matter jurisdiction can-
not be conferred by waiver, forfeiture, estoppel, or consent.54  Even where 
uncontested by the litigants, subject-matter jurisdiction “must be policed by 
the courts on their own initiative.”55  When subject-matter jurisdiction is lack-
ing, the case cannot stay in federal court.56 
 
 47. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (2012). 
 48. Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 716 (1996).  This duty, 
though “strict,” is not “absolute” and may give way where federal abstention is justi-
fied by exceptional circumstances.  Id. 
 49. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 404 (1821).  See id. (“It is most true that 
this Court will not take jurisdiction if it should not: but it is equally true, that it must 
take jurisdiction if it should.”).  Either, ruled the Court, “would be treason to the con-
stitution.”  Id. 
 50. Syngenta Crop Prot., Inc. v. Henson, 537 U.S. 28, 32 (2002) (second altera-
tion in original) (quoting Healy v. Ratta, 292 U.S. 263, 270 (1934)). 
 51. See generally Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 714 (“When a district court remands 
a case to a state court, the district court disassociates itself from the case entirely, 
retaining nothing of the matter on the federal court’s docket.”). 
 52. See Syngenta, 537 U.S. at 32–33. 
 53. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (2012).  See also Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy 
Servs., Inc., 551 U.S. 224, 232 (2007) (failing subject-matter jurisdiction “requires 
remand”). 
 54. See, e.g., Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006) (quoting United 
States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630 (2002)) (cannot be waived or forfeited); Ins. 
Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982) (cita-
tions omitted) (cannot be granted by consent or estoppel). 
 55. Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999).  See also One 
& Ken Valley Hous. Grp. v. Me. State Hous. Auth., 716 F.3d 218, 224 (1st Cir. 2013) 
(noting that even though none of the parties raised the issue of subject-matter jurisdic-
10
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Second, a remand is necessary if the removal is based on a non-
jurisdictional “defect” in removal procedure57 – that is, when any procedural 
requisite for removal has not been satisfied, such as an untimely filing of the 
removal petition,58 a failure of all served defendants to “join in or consent” to 
removal,59 or removing a type of action Congress has declared “nonremova-
ble.”60  Unlike defects in subject-matter jurisdiction, which can be raised at 
any time,61 these procedural requisite defects must be asserted within thirty 
days of the filing of the notice of removal, or the right to object (and to a re-
mand) is lost.62 
Third, a remand is required if the plaintiff seeks, and the trial court 
elects to grant, the joinder of additional defendants whose arrival into the 
lawsuit destroys the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction.63  Granting such join-
der forecloses the district court’s right to retain jurisdiction any further in the 
matter.64 
Fourth, a remand is necessary if a multi-claim lawsuit is removed to 
federal court, containing both a federal question claim and a claim that lacks 
original or supplemental federal subject-matter jurisdiction (or has been made 
 
tion, it remained the court’s “obligation to inquire into our subject matter jurisdiction 
sua sponte”). 
 56. See § 1447(c) (“If at any time before final judgment it appears that the dis-
trict court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.”); Caterpillar 
Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 69 (1996) (same).  Cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3) (“If the 
court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must 
dismiss the action.”). 
 57. § 1447(c).  See generally In re Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 756 F.3d 282, 292 (4th 
Cir. 2014) (citation omitted) (“defect” means “a failure to comply with the statutory 
requirements for removal”). 
 58. See § 1446(b) (establishing thirty-day filing deadline); Things Remembered, 
Inc. v. Petrarca, 516 U.S. 124, 128 (1995) (commenting that untimely removal is 
“precisely the type of removal defect contemplated by § 1447(c)”). 
 59. § 1446(b)(2)(A); Balazik v. Cty. of Dauphin, 44 F.3d 209, 213 (3d Cir. 1995) 
(“Failure of all defendants to join is a ‘defect in the removal procedure’ within the 
meaning of § 1447(c).”). 
 60. See § 1445; Royal v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 685 F.2d 124, 127 (5th Cir. 
1982). 
 61. § 1447(c). 
 62. Id.  See Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 69 (1996).  See also id. at 76–
77 (“[I]f, at the end of the day and case, a jurisdictional defect remains uncured, the 
judgment must be vacated.”). 
 63. See § 1447(e); Lindner v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 762 F.3d 568, 570–71 (7th 
Cir. 2014) (when addition of new parties will destroy diversity, the district court is 
“required to remand the case”). 
 64. See Schur v. L.A. Weight Loss Ctrs., Inc., 577 F.3d 752, 759 (7th Cir. 2009) 
(citation omitted) (“When joinder of a nondiverse party would destroy subject matter 
jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1447(e) applies and provides the district court two options: 
(1) deny joinder, or (2) permit joinder and remand the action to state court.  These are 
the only options; the district court may not permit joinder of a nondiverse defendant 
and retain jurisdiction.”). 
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otherwise unremovable by statute).65  In such lawsuits, the non-federal claim 
must be severed away and remanded to state court.66 
Fifth, a remand is presumptively required (though only rebuttably so) in 
litigations made removable under Congress’s multiparty, multiforum jurisdic-
tion statute67 when the district court “has made a liability determination re-
quiring further proceedings as to damages.”68  In such circumstances, howev-
er, remand may nevertheless be refused if the court finds that jurisdiction 
should be retained “for the convenience of parties and witnesses and in the 
interest of justice.”69 
Sixth, a remand is permitted (though not compelled) when a district 
court determines that continued exercise of its supplemental jurisdiction over 
state law claims would be inappropriate.70  The decision to remand, rather 
than dismiss, such lawsuits remains vested in the district judge’s considered 
discretion, informed by various considerations, including the status of the 
applicable statute of limitations, the risk of preclusion of valid state law 
claims, the state’s interests in enforcing its laws, and the “economy, conven-
ience, fairness, and comity” achieved through a remand rather than a more 
obtrusive dismissal-and-refiling (with its attendant delays and costs).71 
Seventh, a remand is also permitted, again in the exercise of the district 
court’s discretion, where the litigants seek an equitable or otherwise discre-
tionary remedy and “appropriate circumstances” counsel the court to abstain 
from exercising federal jurisdiction “altogether” and, instead, warrant the 
entry of an order “either dismissing the suit or remanding it to state court.”72 
Those are the bases for remanding a removed lawsuit back to state court.  
Unless one of these bases (or some other, authorized by Congress) for remand 
 
 65. See § 1441(c)(1)(A)–(B). 
 66. See id. § 1441(c)(2). 
 67. See id. § 1369.  The federal courts’ multiparty, multiforum jurisdiction is 
triggered upon the occurrence of a single sudden accident (or natural event culminat-
ing in an accident), which causes the deaths of at least seventy-five natural persons at 
a discrete location, provided certain other statutory prerequisites are met.  Id. 
 68. See id. § 1441(e)(2). 
 69. Id. 
 70. Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 351 (1988) (“Because in 
some circumstances a remand of a removed case involving pendent claims will better 
accommodate these values than will dismissal of the case, the animating principle 
behind the pendent jurisdiction doctrine supports giving a district court discretion to 
remand when the exercise of pendent jurisdiction is inappropriate.”).  Although the 
Cohill decision predated Congress’s codification of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction 
in 28 U.S.C. § 1367, the remand option remains recognized as a prerogative of the 
court in “declin[ing] to exercise supplemental jurisdiction” as Section 1367(c) now 
allows.  See Hinson v. Norwest Fin. S.C., Inc., 239 F.3d 611, 616–17 (4th Cir. 2001).  
See also Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U.S. 635, 636–41 (2009) (implied-
ly acknowledging that discretionary declinations of supplemental jurisdictional can 
support remands back to state court). 
 71. See Carnegie-Mellon Univ., 484 U.S. at 351–53 & 357. 
 72. See Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 721 (1996). 
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is implicated, the district court enjoys no other, roving prerogative to re-
mand.73  This much seems sure.  Indeed, the Supreme Court repelled one 
such attempt in 1976, when it sternly admonished a district judge for having 
remanded a properly removed case because of that court’s crowded docket, 
the press of other cases on its sparse available trial time, and the feared result-
ing “severe[] impair[ment]” on the plaintiff’s entitlement to relief.74  The 
remand authority of federal trial judges, then, is decidedly curtailed. 
C.  The No-Review Directive 
This journey takes now an odd turn.  If, as any wide-eyed 1L can recite 
by rote, federal courts are indeed tribunals of limited jurisdiction, entitled to 
exercise only that authority denominated expressly in the U.S. Constitution 
and federal law, such that federal subject-matter jurisdiction is presumed not 
to exist (until established otherwise),75 and if, further, relinquishment of fed-
eral judicial power, once acquired, is never to be done idly or without ex-
pressly prescribed warrant,76 this whole business of remand ought to be sub-
ject to the most searching, the most scrupulous of oversights. 
Not so.  Rather than a searching, scrupulous level of oversight, Congress 
provided none whatsoever when a remand is granted.77  In point of fact, Con-
gress’s mandate was quite a bit more curt, peremptory, and heavy-handed 
than just a simple “none.”78  In the very crispest of prose,79 Congress outright 
forbade it: “An order remanding a case to the State court from which it was 
removed is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise . . . .”80  That prohibition 
now lies codified in Section 1447(d) of the Judiciary Code.81  Review by 
direct appeal is forbidden; review by extraordinary writ or “otherwise” is 
 
 73. See Thermtron Prods., Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336, 351 (1976) 
(ruling that Congress had not conferred upon the federal trial courts “carte blanche 
authority . . . to revise the federal statutes governing removal”).  See also Osborn v. 
Haley, 549 U.S. 225, 240 (2007). 
 74. Thermtron Prods., Inc., 423 U.S. at 340–41.  See id. (“[A]n otherwise 
properly removed action may no more be remanded because the district court consid-
ers itself too busy to try it than an action properly filed in the federal court in the first 
instance may be dismissed or referred to state courts for such reason.”). 
 75. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). 
 76. See supra notes 48–73 and accompanying text. 
 77. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (2012). 
 78. Id. 
 79. See Osborn v. Haley, 549 U.S. 225, 268–69 (2007) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(“[I]t is hard to imagine new statutory language accomplishing the desired result any 
more clearly than § 1447(d) already does”). 
 80. § 1447(d). 
 81. Id. 
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forbidden.82  Indeed, even reconsideration by the very judge who issued the 
remand order in the first place is forbidden.83  Review is forbidden where the 
remand decision is challenged as being legally erroneous,84 where the deci-
sion is provable to be in fact actually erroneous,85 and even where the deci-
sion is “manifestly, inarguably erroneous.”86  Review is forbidden where an 
error in the remand decision could rouse ominous “undesirable consequenc-
es,” even in the forebodingly “sensitive” realm of our foreign relations with 
other nations.87  Far different than the searching, scrupulous oversight one 
might have expected, the no-review statute instead “made the district courts 
the final arbiters of whether Congress intended that specific actions were to 
be tried in a federal court.”88  District judges were to make this call, and their 
 
 82. See Thermtron Prods., Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336, 343 (1976); 
United States v. Rice, 327 U.S. 742, 751 (1946); Ex parte Pa. Co., 137 U.S. 451, 454 
(1890). 
 83. See In re Lowe, 102 F.3d 731, 734 (4th Cir. 1996) (“Indisputably, ‘other-
wise’ in § 1447(d) includes reconsideration by the district court.”); Three J Farms, 
Inc. v. Alton Box Bd. Co., 609 F.2d 112, 115 (4th Cir. 1979) (“Unquestionably, the 
statute not only forecloses appellate review, but also bars reconsideration of such an 
order by the district court.”); In re La Providencia Dev. Corp., 406 F.2d 251, 252–53 
(1st Cir. 1969) (“[T]here is no more reason for a district court being able to review its 
own decision, and revoke the remand, than for an appellate court requiring it to do so.  
Both are foreclosed; nothing could be more inclusive than the phrase ‘on appeal or 
otherwise.’”). 
 84. See Gravitt v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 430 U.S. 723, 723–24 (1977) (“remands are 
not reviewable” even when it is suggested that remand was grounded on “erroneous 
principles”). 
 85. See Thermtron Prods., Inc., 423 U.S. at 343 (“[T]his section prohibits review 
of all remand orders issued pursuant to § 1447(c), whether erroneous or not . . . .”).  
See also Osborn v. Haley, 549 U.S. 225, 265 (2007) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[O]ur 
precedents make abundantly clear that § 1447(d)’s appellate-review bar applies with 
full force to erroneous remand orders.”); Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust, 547 U.S. 
633, 640 (2006) (quoting Thermtron Prods., Inc., 423 U.S. at 351) (applies “whether 
or not that order might be deemed erroneous by an appellate court”). 
 86. In re Blackwater Sec. Consulting, LLC, 460 F.3d 576, 582 (4th Cir. 2006) 
(quoting Mangold v. Analytic Servs., Inc., 77 F.3d 1442, 1450 (4th Cir. 1996) (Phil-
lips, J., specially concurring and delivering the opinion of the court on the issue of 
subject matter jurisdiction)).  See also Kircher, 547 U.S. at 634 (citing Briscoe v. 
Bell, 432 U.S. 404, 413–14 n.13 (1977)) (“[R]eview is unavailable no matter how 
plain the legal error in ordering the remand.”). 
 87. See Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Servs., Inc., 551 U.S. 224, 236–37 
(2007).  See also id. at 238–39 (“Appellate courts must take that jurisdictional pre-
scription seriously, however pressing the merits of the appeal might seem.”). 
 88. Thermtron Prods., Inc., 423 U.S. at 355 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).  See also 
Things Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca, 516 U.S. 124, 127 (1995) (“Congress has 
placed broad restrictions on the power of federal appellate courts to review district 
court orders remanding removed cases to state court.”); Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Fitzger-
ald, 160 U.S. 556, 583 (1896) (“[C]ongress was manifestly of [the] opinion that the 
determination of the circuit court that jurisdiction could not be maintained should be 
14
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call – once made – was to be final.  “The district court has one shot, right or 
wrong.”89  It is a mantra the Supreme Court has subsequently “relentlessly 
repeated.”90 
Courts have had little trouble discerning the legislative rationale behind 
this “no-review” prohibition.91  The process of removal “works a significant 
interference in the conduct of litigation commenced in state court.”92  Such 
interference implicates deeply creditable concerns of “judicial economy,” 
“respect for the state court,” and “principles of comity.”93  Plainly, Congress 
must have foreseen those consequences of removal, inexorable as they are; 
yet by proceeding to craft a removal right, it willingly accepted that intrusion 
as tolerable and appropriate in those circumstances where the statutory pre-
requisites for removal were met.94 
But Congress also endeavored to minimize this intrusion’s capacity to 
endlessly delay the ultimate adjudication of the merits dispute.95  It sought a 
procedural design that would avoid “prolonged litigation of questions of ju-
 
final.”); Ex parte Pa. Co., 137 U.S. 451, 454 (1890) (“[I]t was the intention of Con-
gress to make the judgment of the circuit court [now, district courts] remanding a 
cause to the state court final and conclusive.”).  See generally James E. Pfander, Col-
lateral Review of Remand Orders: Reasserting the Supervisory Role of the Supreme 
Court, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 493, 494 (2011) (“[Section 1447(d)] appears to give district 
court judges the final word when they grant a motion to remand to state court.”). 
 89. In re La Providencia Dev. Corp., 406 F.2d 251, 253 (1st Cir. 1969). 
 90. Kircher, 547 U.S. at 640.  See, e.g., Things Remembered, Inc., 516 U.S. at 
128 (statute “compels the conclusion” that post-entry review is forbidden); Gravitt v. 
Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 430 U.S. 723, 723 (1977) (per curiam) (statute “unmistakably 
commands” no-review); Thermtron Prods., Inc., 423 U.S. at 343 (no-review “has 
been the established rule . . . stretching back to 1887”). 
 91. See Pfander, supra note 88, at 523.  To be more precise, they have at least 
had little trouble in incanting the avoidance-of-prolonged-litigation rationale.  See id.  
However, that stated rationale may not, as a matter of historical fact, be entirely accu-
rate.  See id.  It appears that the 1887 advent of the no-review directive may instead 
have been motivated originally by Congress’s concern with the harrowing backlog of 
cases on the Supreme Court’s docket “at a time when it was the nation’s only federal 
appellate tribunal.”  Id.  See also Rhonda Wasserman, Rethinking Review of Re-
mands: Proposed Amendments to the Federal Removal Statute, 43 EMORY L.J. 83, 87 
(1994) (opining that no-review directive emerged “in the face of a crushing Supreme 
Court workload and an inability to reach consensus on the need for a circuit court of 
appeals”); Solimine, supra note 2, at 291 (noting that “Congressional purpose” for the 
no-review directive “is obscure,” but “[a]t the time, there was great concern over the 
burgeoning caseloads of federal courts . . . and the 1887 law . . . restricted access to 
federal courts”). 
 92. Thermtron Prods., Inc., 423 U.S. at 354 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 93. In re La Providencia Dev. Corp., 406 F.2d at 252. 
 94. See Thermtron Prods., Inc., 423 U.S. at 354 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) 
(“Congress felt that making available a federal forum in appropriate instances justifies 
some such interruption and delay . . . .”). 
 95. See id. at 355 (“Congress decided that [the ability to invoke appellate review] 
was an unacceptable source of additional delay . . . .”). 
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risdiction of the district court to which the cause is removed.”96  Concomi-
tantly, it intended to limit the disquieting spectacle of the repeated “shuttling” 
of a lawsuit repeatedly back and forth and back again, between the federal 
and state fora,97 not to mention the attendant increase in litigation costs.98  
After all, state courts are presumed certainly competent to address and resolve 
federal claims.99 
Congress accomplished these competing objectives by “mak[ing] the 
judgment of the [federal trial] court remanding a cause to the state court final 
and conclusive,” thereby “putting an end to the question of removal” by 
“suppress[ing] further prolongation of the controversy by whatever pro-
cess.”100  In short, Congress trimmed the remand/removal contest “by deny-
ing any form of review of an order of remand, and, before final judgment, of 
an order denying remand.”101  In doing so, “Congress undoubtedly recog-
nized that some remand orders would be entered in error, [but] thought that, 
all in all, justice would better be served by allowing that small minority of 
cases to proceed in state courts than by subjecting every remanded case to 
 
 96. United States v. Rice, 327 U.S. 742, 751 (1946).  Accord Powerex Corp. v. 
Reliant Energy Servs., Inc., 551 U.S. 224, 237 & 238 (2007); Kircher v. Putnam 
Funds Trust, 547 U.S. 633, 640 (2006).  See also Thermtron Prods., Inc., 423 U.S. at 
354–55 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“[Congress] obviously thought it equally im-
portant that when removal to a federal court is not warranted the case should be re-
turned to the state court as expeditiously as possible.”); Ellenburg v. Spartan Motor 
Chassis, Inc., 519 F.3d 192, 196 (4th Cir. 2008) (“The important policy carried in this 
provision disfavors prolonged interruptions to litigation created by litigating which of 
two otherwise legitimate courts should resolve the disputes between the parties.”).  
See generally Solimine, supra note 2, at 310 n.129 (noting Congress’s concern with 
“State or Federal courts, or the parties . . . [being] subject to the burdens of shuttling a 
case between two courts that each have subject matter jurisdiction,” and quoting leg-
islative history explaining amendment to companion provision in Section 1447(c)). 
 97. See Osborn v. Haley, 549 U.S. 225, 243 (2007) (commenting that that the no-
review prohibition in Section 1447(d) is an “antishuttling” provision).  For an inter-
esting exploration of Congress’s broader success in, and impediments against, realiz-
ing this “antishuttling” objective, see Julie Fukes Stewart, Note, “Litigation Is Not 
Ping-Pong,” Except When It Is: Resolving the Westfall Act’s Circularity Problem, 95 
CORNELL L. REV. 1021 (2010). 
 98. See Osborn, 549 U.S. at 268 (2007) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“In an all-too-
rare effort to reduce the high cost of litigation, Congress provided that remand orders 
are completely unreviewable ‘on appeal or otherwise.’”). 
 99. See Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Fitzgerald, 160 U.S. 556, 583 (1896) (“It must be 
remembered that when federal questions arise in causes pending in the state courts, 
those courts are perfectly competent to decide them, and it is their duty to do so.”).  
This is especially true where subject-matter jurisdiction is founded only on diversity; 
such cases are, after all, state law claims where the principal advantage a federal tri-
bunal is adding is a further (or at least more public) assurance of impartiality.  Id. 
 100. Ex parte Pa. Co., 137 U.S. 451, 454 (1890). 
 101. Rice, 327 U.S. at 751. 
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endless rounds of forum disputes.”102  It was, at base, a legislative “tradeoff 
of sorts.”103 
It wasn’t always this way.  Review of a federal trial judge’s remand or-
ders was formerly part of the federal tradition.104  The Supreme Court had 
expressly recognized such review as a proper exercise of the mandamus au-
thority,105 and later, in 1875, Congress invested in the Supreme Court such 
review authority by statute.106  Twelve years hence, however, Congress ab-
ruptly abrogated this review path and proscribed all review by appeal or oth-
erwise of federal trial court remand orders.107  The abrogating statute was re-
enacted a year later for technical purposes, but its operative no-review prohi-
bition was unchanged.108  Congress’s intention seemed quite clear to the Su-
preme Court in 1890: it was “to contract the jurisdiction of the federal 
courts.”109  Except for one brief interlude between 1948 and 1949, when re-
 
 102. Osborn, 549 U.S. at 268 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  See Thermtron Prods., Inc. 
v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336, 355 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“All deci-
sion-makers err from time to time, and judicial systems frequently provide some re-
view to remedy some of those errors.  But such review is certainly not compelled.  
Congress balanced the continued disruption and delay caused by further review 
against the minimal possible harm to the party attempting removal who will still re-
ceive a trial on the merits before a state court which cannot be presumed to be unwill-
ing or unable to afford substantial justice and concluded that no review should be 
permitted in these cases.”). 
 103. Osborn, 549 U.S.at 268 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  See also Thermtron Prods., 
Inc., 423 U.S. at 355  (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“If this balanced concern is disre-
garded, federal removal provisions may become a device affording litigants a means 
of substantially delaying justice.”). 
 104. See Wasserman, supra note 91, at 87 (“[F]or a full century-from 1789 to 
1887-remand orders were subject to review in the Supreme Court”); Solimine, supra 
note 2, at 290 (“The 1789 [Judiciary] Act did not forbid appellate review (at the time, 
directly to the Supreme Court), but the Court held that remand decisions were not 
‘final orders’ subject to appeal, and could only be reviewed by a writ of mandamus.”). 
 105. R.R. Co. v. Wiswall, 90 U.S. 507, 508 (1874).  See Georgia v. Rachel, 384 
U.S. 780, 786 n.6 (1966). 
 106. Jurisdiction and Removal Act of 1875, ch. 137, § 5, 18 Stat. 470, 472 (Mar. 
3, 1875) (“[T]he order of said circuit court dismissing or remanding said cause to the 
State court shall be reviewable by the Supreme Court on writ of error or appeal, as the 
case may be.”). 
 107. Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 373, § 2, 24 Stat. 552, 553 (“Whenever any cause 
shall be removed from any State-court into any circuit court of the United States, and 
the circuit court shall decide that the cause was improperly removed, and order the 
same to be remanded to the State court from whence it came, such remand shall be 
immediately carried into execution, and no appeal or writ of error from the decision, 
of the circuit court so remanding such cause shall be allowed.”). 
 108. Act of Aug. 13, 1888, ch. 866, § 2, 25 Stat. 433, 435. 
 109. Ex parte Pa. Co., 137 U.S. 451, 454 (1890).   See also Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. v. 
Fitzgerald, 160 U.S. 556, 583 (1896) (regarding Congress’s intention was “to restrict 
the jurisdiction of the circuit court, and to restrain the volume of litigation, which, 
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codification of the remand statute inadvertently omitted the no-review di-
rective, the prohibition against post-entry review of a district court’s remand 
grants has continued to the present day.110 
Curiously, Congress’s commitment to avoiding a prolonging of proce-
dural skirmishes over the place of litigation is only half-hearted.  Truly.  De-
nials of a remand motion are vulnerable to reversal on appeal, even to inter-
locutory appellate reexamination upon certification by the district judge.111  
Such reversals could implicate a truly spectacular level of delay and cost by 
negating an entire series of federal proceedings (perhaps even a post-verdict 
federal judgment) and forcing a litigation “do-over” in state court.112  The no-
review directive does nothing to lessen this threat to judicial economy.113  
Congress’s devotion to suppressing wastes of judicial resources seems some-
what less than zealous. 
In any event, the facially unforgiving absolutism of this no-review pro-
hibition mellowed over time.114  Exemptions and exclusions, both granted 
statutorily by Congress and uncovered judicially by the Supreme Court, trans-
formed the no-review prohibition from the seemingly imposing legal mono-
lith it once had been into a still sturdy, but not entirely predictable, legal 
boundary.  First, in specifically qualifying the no-review directive, Congress 
carved two statutorily exempted categories into the very language of the pro-
hibition itself, making those types of lawsuits susceptible to post-entry re-
view.115  Second, Congress elsewhere provided expressly for review of re-
mands in other specific statutory contexts.116  Third, the broad, non-specific 
 
through the expansion of federal jurisdiction in respect of the removal of causes, had 
been pouring into the courts of the United States”). 
 110. See Thermtron Prods., Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336, 347–48 & 350 
n.15 (1976) (tracking codification and recodification of the law, noting that the “no-
review” directive had been “inexplicably omitted” from the codifying legislation in 
1948, notwithstanding that “[t]here was no intent to change the prior law substantive-
ly,” and that “[t]he omission was quickly rectified” a year later). 
 111. See, e.g., Woodard v. STP Corp., 170 F.3d 1043, 1044 (11th Cir. 1999). 
 112. See generally 15A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 3914.11, at 698–99 (2d ed. 1992) (discussing potential waste resulting 
from intervening proceedings). 
 113. Of course, if the denial of remand is reversed for lack of subject-matter juris-
diction, neither the courts nor Congress have much choice in the matter.  See general-
ly supra notes 53–56 and accompanying text. 
 114. See Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Servs., Inc., 551 U.S. 224, 229 (2007) 
(determining whether review of a district court’s remand order “is, alas, not as easy as 
one would expect from a mere reading of this text, for we have interpreted § 1447(d) 
to cover less than its words alone suggest”). 
 115. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (2012) (permitting review “by appeal or otherwise” of 
certain lawsuits against federal officers or agencies, id. § 1442; and certain civil rights 
lawsuits, id. § 1443). 
 116. See Powerex Corp., 551 U.S. at 237 (noting that “Congress has repeatedly 
demonstrated its readiness to exempt particular classes of remand orders from § 
1447(d) when it wishes,” citing examples of such statutory exemptions); Kircher v. 
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no-review directive now gives way when confronted by a different, narrow, 
and context-specific “antishuttling” law that would be rendered ineffective if 
post-remand review were refused.117  Fourth, Congress’s revised no-review 
statute is now read in pari materia with the statute’s other provisions, such 
that the no-review prohibition in Section 1447(d) only applies to the two re-
mand-authorizing categories set out in the immediately preceding Section 
1447(c) – namely, lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and “improvident” re-
movals (replaced, in the now-current statute, with the more cumbersome syn-
tax “any defect other than lack of subject matter jurisdiction”).118  Fifth, a 
limited examination of remand rulings can be permitted for the purpose of 
inquiring whether a district court accurately self-characterized the grounds for 
its remand decision as jurisdictionally-based.119  Sixth, when a remand ruling 
is entered alongside a separate order dismissing one of the parties to the law-
suit, that separate order is not insulated from appeal so long as it can be fairly 
“disaggregated” from the remand order (which, in all respects, remains unal-
tered).120 
 
Putnam Funds Trust, 547 U.S. 633, 641 n.8 (2006) (same point); Osborn v. Haley, 
549 U.S. 225, 265–66 (2007) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (same point). 
 117. See Osborn, 549 U.S. at 244.  The Court in Osborn examined the Westfall 
Act, which accords federal employees immunity from certain claims that arise out of 
conduct undertaken in the scope of their official duties upon certification by the At-
torney General that the employees at issue were, indeed, acting at relevant times in 
the scope of their employment.  Id. at 229–30.  The Court found that certification to 
be conclusive, that Congress barred district judges from rejecting the Attorney Gen-
eral’s certification, and that remands to State court premised on such rejections were 
improper and could be overturned – notwithstanding the no-review prohibition of 
Section 1447(d).  Id. at 243–44.  But cf. id. (citations omitted) (“Our decision that [the 
Westfall Act] leaves the district court without authority to send a certified case back 
to the state court scarcely means that whenever the district court misconstrues a juris-
dictional statute, appellate review of the remand is in order.  Such an exception 
would, of course, collide head on with § 1447(d), and with our precedent.  Only in the 
extraordinary case in which Congress has ordered the intercourt shuttle to travel just 
one way—from state to federal court—does today’s decision hold sway.”). 
 118. Thermtron Prods., Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336, 345–46 (1976).  See 
Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF BIO, Inc., 556 U.S. 635, 638 (2009); Kircher, 547 U.S. at 
640; Powerex Corp., 551 U.S. at 229; Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 
706, 711–12 (1996); Things Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca, 516 U.S. 124, 127–28 
(1995).  See also Osborn, 549 U.S. at 239–40 & n.8, 263 (noting in pari materia limi-
tation, and subsequent revision to Section 1447(c) to replace “improvident” removal 
language). 
 119. See Kircher, 547 U.S. at 641–42.  A year later, the Court clarified that these 
sorts of “behind-the-curtain” inquiries were highly limited ones.  See Powerex Corp., 
551 U.S. at 234 (“[R]eview of the District Court’s characterization of its remand as 
resting upon lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, to the extent it is permissible at all, 
should be limited to confirming that that characterization was colorable.”). 
 120. See City of Waco v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co., 293 U.S. 140, 143–44 (1934) 
(“True, no appeal lies from the order of remand; but in logic and in fact the decree of 
dismissal preceded that of remand and was made by the District Court while it had 
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As this tour shows, Section 1447(d) has become a bit of a puzzle.  This 
no-review directive remains imposing and continues to count loyal vanguards 
among nearly all the changing members of the Supreme Court, term to term.  
But, now pockmarked with exemptions from Congress and exclusions by the 
Court, its barrier is not nearly so formidable as it was when it was first in-
vented about two decades after the death of Lincoln.  Still, the Supreme Court 
has been chary to pull more bricks down off the no-review wall, and it has 
been unwilling to infer new exclusions premised merely on policy considera-
tions it finds more properly reserved to the province of the legislature: “We 
will not ignore a clear jurisdictional statute in reliance upon supposition of 
what Congress really wanted.”121 
The “preliminaries” of removal, remand, and the no-review directive 
behind us, this Article now turns to its central question: What does Section 
1447(d)’s no-review directive portend for remand orders that are the product 
of litigant deception? 
II.  REMANDS BY DECEPTION 
In the more than a century and a quarter that the no-review directive of 
Section 1447(d) has been a fixture in federal law, the total number of reported 
cases squarely tackling the issue of deceptively-induced remands appears to 
be exactly one.  But that one case is a wonderfully capable canvas on which 
to sketch out this conundrum and explore its meaning.  The case is recent.  It 
is appellate.  Its final disposition is en banc.  And it enjoys a rich bounty of 
legal analysis in support and in opposition to the deceptively-induced re-
mands question. 
That opinion, the divided en banc decision in Barlow v. Colgate Palmol-
ive Co.,122 is introduced below, first, with a factual orientation to the contest, 
then sketching the contours of the court’s ruling, and finally exploring the 
decisional analysis offered by both the court’s majority and dissent.  Ulti-
mately, the en banc court ruled “no” – the federal courts’ longstanding no-
review prohibition does not prevent a remand order from being overturned if 
 
control of the cause. . . .  A reversal [of the dismissal order on appeal] cannot affect 
the order of remand, but it will at least, if the dismissal . . . was erroneous, remit the 
entire controversy, with the [dismissed litigant] still a party, to the state court for such 
further proceedings as may be in accordance with law.”).  See also Kircher, 547 U.S. 
at 644 n.13 (noting that the remand order in City of Waco could not, instructed the 
Court, be “affect[ed]” by the later appeal, since the two orders could be “disaggregat-
ed”). 
 121. Powerex Corp., 551 U.S. at 237.  See also id. at 237–38  (citation omitted) 
(holding that whether any particular policy concern “outweighs § 1447(d)’s general 
interest in avoiding prolonged litigation on threshold nonmerits questions, is a policy 
debate that belongs in the halls of Congress, not in the hearing room of this Court”). 
The Court made clear: “As far as the Third Branch is concerned, what the text of § 
1447(d) indisputably does prevails over what it ought to have done.”  Id. 
 122. 772 F.3d 1001 (4th Cir. 2014). 
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that order was issued by a deceptively “hoodwinked” district judge.123  The 
Fourth Circuit seems to be the very first to so hold. 
A.  Barlow v. Colgate: The Factual Setting 
From the outset of this discussion, one point must be clear.  The Fourth 
Circuit in Barlow never ruled that the litigants in the lawsuit, or their attor-
neys, actually engaged in any deception of the trial judge, only that proof of 
such deception (were it to be developed) could, as a matter of law, warrant 
relief from a remand order in an appropriate case.124  If that appears a long 
journey for an ultimately relief-denying outcome, the court is in heady com-
pany.125 
Joyce Barlow and Clara Mosko were each diagnosed with mesothelioma 
and filed separate personal injury lawsuits in the Circuit Court of Baltimore 
County against thirty-six defendants, including the Colgate Palmolive Com-
pany (“Colgate”).126  They alleged that they each contracted their illnesses 
from exposure to asbestos either “during the course of their employment,” or 
“within their homes, by virtue of second hand asbestos exposure from their 
husbands or in-home improvement projects.”127  Each plaintiff demanded $40 
million in compensatory damages and $15 million in punitive damages on 
various state law claims, including strict liability, warranty breach, negli-
gence, and fraud.128  The particular liability theory against defendant Colgate 
was grounded in both plaintiffs’ long histories using a Colgate beauty powder 
known as “Cashmere Bouquet” which, they contended, contained harmful 
asbestos levels that could have caused their mesothelioma.129 
Plaintiffs Barlow and Mosko were citizens of Maryland and Florida, re-
spectively; Colgate was a citizen of Delaware and New York.130  Consequent-
ly, federal diversity jurisdiction would ordinarily be foreclosed if any of Col-
 
 123. Id. at 1010. 
 124. In fact, as discussed below, after the Fourth Circuit returned the case to the 
district court for further proceedings, the presiding trial judge ruled that Colgate failed 
to carry its heavy burden to warrant a vacatur.  See infra notes 315–18. 
 125. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803) (denying Mr. Marbury’s petition 
to force delivery of his commission as a new justice of the peace, but announcing the 
principle of judicial review while doing so). 
 126. Barlow, 772 F.3d at 1005.  See also Appellees’ Brief in Opposition, Barlow, 
772 F.3d 1001 (No. 13-1839(L)), 2013 WL 4397456, at *1–2. 
 127. Appellees’ Brief in Opposition, supra note 126, at *2. 
 128. See Brief for Defendant-Appellant Colgate-Palmolive Co., Barlow, 772 F.3d 
1001, No. 13-1839(L), 2013 WL 3761163, at *7 
 129. Barlow, 772 F.3d at 1004.  See also Appellees’ Brief in Opposition, supra 
note 126, at *1–2. 
 130. See Brief for Defendant-Appellant Colgate-Palmolive Co., supra note 128, at 
*7. 
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gate’s fellow defendants were citizens of Maryland or Florida.131  And, in-
deed, both complaints named several such non-diverse defendants, thereby 
seemingly to block any removal based on diversity of citizenship.132 
As discovery progressed in state court in Baltimore, however, it ap-
peared to Colgate that it, and it alone, had evolved into the exclusive, singular 
target of the plaintiffs’ lawsuits.133  Believing that this maturing discovery 
record rendered the two lawsuits removable under diversity of citizenship 
principles, Colgate filed notices of removal in both cases, invoking the doc-
trine of fraudulent joinder to posit that the citizenships of all defendants other 
than Colgate should be disregarded in assessing the federal court’s diversity 
jurisdiction.134 
Plaintiffs responded to the removal by moving the newly presiding fed-
eral judges for remands back to the Baltimore state court.135  To do so, both 
plaintiffs compiled factual records to support their remand motions.136  Plain-
tiff Barlow argued that she had heard that her former place of employment 
may have had asbestos in the building, that she may have been exposed while 
working on the assembly lines there, and that she ate lunch under fans at that 
facility (which may have been recirculating contaminated air).137  Likewise, 
Plaintiff Mosko argued that her former place of employment “was frequently 
being renovated,” that new ceilings and a subbasement were under construc-
tion, and that invoices from a possible asbestos supplier might indicate the 
 
 131. See id.  See also 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) & (c) (2012); Lincoln Prop. Co. v. 
Roche, 546 U.S. 81, 84 (2005) (“Defendants may remove an action on the basis of 
diversity of citizenship if there is complete diversity between all named plaintiffs and 
all named defendants, and no defendant is a citizen of the forum State.”). 
 132. See Brief for Defendant-Appellant Colgate-Palmolive Co., supra note 128, at 
*7. 
 133. See id. (alterations in original) (record citations omitted) (“Neither Plaintiff 
identified any potential source of asbestos other than Colgate’s Cashmere Bouquet, 
either in their . . . responses to Colgate’s interrogatories, or in their subsequent deposi-
tions in which each Plaintiff agreed that she had no evidence to support a claim 
against any defendant other than Colgate.  Mosko confirmed that ‘the only product 
that [she] believe[s] contained asbestos [she was] exposed to was Cashmere Bouquet.’  
Barlow likewise repeatedly admitted that she did not ‘believe that [she] w[as] exposed 
to asbestos through any source other than Cashmere Bouquet.’”). 
 134. Barlow, 772 F.3d at 1004.  See also Brief for Defendant-Appellant Colgate-
Palmolive Co., supra note 128, at *8–9.  Under the doctrine of fraudulent joinder, the 
citizenship of non-diverse parties will be disregarded for jurisdictional purposes if 
either (1) an actual fraud was committed by the pleader in naming those parties or (2) 
“there is no possibility that the plaintiff would be able to establish a cause of action 
against” those parties in state court.  Weidman v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 776 F.3d 214, 
218 (4th Cir. 2015). 
 135. See Brief for Defendant-Appellant Colgate-Palmolive Co., Barlow, supra 
note 128, at *10. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Barlow, 772 F.3d at 1005.  See also Appellees’ Brief in Opposition, supra 
note 126, at *5. 
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presence of asbestos in the construction.138  This meager factual record, Plain-
tiff Barlow conceded, was “hardly ‘unequivocal’”; in fact, it posited a theory 
that she expressly disavowed later in her deposition where she testified that 
any workplace-related asbestos source was “based on gossip, rumor, and 
hearsay” and even failed to convince her.139  Similarly, Plaintiff Mosko testi-
fied during her deposition that she, too, also did not believe that her asbestos 
exposure had a work-related source.140 
On the weight of their respective records, both plaintiffs insisted in their 
remand motions that asbestos-exposure claims against non-diverse defendants 
were “a possibility” and “certainly plausible.”141  Agreeing with plaintiffs, the 
federal judges ruled that the doctrine of “fraudulent joinder” could not apply 
given the presence of tenable claims against non-diverse parties, that subject-
matter jurisdiction over the two lawsuits therefore failed for want of complete 
diversity, and that remands were required.142 
Now returned to a Baltimore state court, Plaintiffs Barlow and Mosko 
moved to consolidate their two cases with other there-pending cases that also 
were alleging asbestos-related injuries from exposure to Colgate’s “Cashmere 
Bouquet” beauty powder.143  But Colgate opposed this consolidation.144  It 
emphasized how Plaintiffs’ own arguments before the federal judges demon-
strated a variety of diverse, non-Colgate asbestos exposure sources peculiar to 
these two individual litigants, rendering them quite dissimilar from other, 
Colgate-only exposure claimants and, thus, unfit for the requested consolida-
tion.145  Confronted with their earlier advocacy, Plaintiffs did not relent, but 
instead pressed forward, insisting now that Colgate – and only Colgate – was 
the source of their respective asbestos exposures: 
[Plaintiffs] allege exposure to asbestos-containing Cashmere Bouquet 
powder products only and do not allege exposure to any other asbes-
tos, asbestos-containing products or asbestos-containing dust in any 
 
 138. Barlow, 772 F.3d at 1005.  See also Appellees’ Brief in Opposition, supra 
note 126, at *5. 
 139. Barlow, 772 F.3d at 1005 & n.4. 
 140. Id. at 1006 & n.5. 
 141. Id. at 1005. 
 142. Id. at 1004–06.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (2012) (“If at any time before final 
judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case 
shall be remanded.”).  See also In re Blackwater Sec. Consulting, LLC, 460 F.3d 576, 
589 (4th Cir. 2006) (“[O]nce a district court determines that it lacks subject matter 
jurisdiction over a removed case, § 1447(c) directs that the case ‘shall be remanded.’  
This mandate is so clear that, once a district court has found that it lacks subject mat-
ter jurisdiction in a removed case, no other fact-finding, legal analysis, or exercise of 
judicial discretion is necessary in order to follow the congressional directive; the 
decision to remand a case to remedy a lack of subject matter jurisdiction is purely 
ministerial.”). 
 143. Barlow, 772 F.3d at 1005. 
 144. Id. at 1006. 
 145. Id. 
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other form. . . .  [N]either Plaintiffs’ worksites nor their occupations 
are relevant to this consolidation review because each of the Plaintiffs 
were exposed, in their homes, to asbestos-containing Cashmere Bou-
quet only. . . .  The occupations or worksites of the Plaintiffs should 
not affect the consolidation of these cases for trial because not one of 
the Plaintiffs testified that they were exposed to asbestos as a result of 
their employment. . . .  In short, there is absolutely no evidence to in-
dicate or even suggest that the Plaintiffs were exposed to asbestos in 
any form other than Cashmere Bouquet.146 
During a hearing on the Plaintiffs’ consolidation motion, the seemingly 
flabbergasted Baltimore state court judge admonished counsel: “I can’t be-
lieve you actually told [two federal judges] one thing and tell me another.”147  
The state judge pressed further: 
THE COURT: So you told the judges in the U.S. District Court that 
you were contending there was no viable claim against any of these 
other defendants? 
COUNSEL: All we had to prove in federal court is that there was a 
glimmer of hope.  And the glimmer of hope is [what] we alleged in the 
complaint a case against Maryland defendants . . . . 
THE COURT: So once the case came back here, the glimmer disap-
peared? . . . 
COUNSEL: The glimmer is in federal court.148 
To avoid any uncertainty or misunderstanding on the point, the state court 
judge pressed Plaintiffs’ counsel still further for an unequivocal confirmation: 
“It is a one-defendant case, right?”  Plaintiffs’ counsel responded: “Yes.”149 
Colgate returned to federal court.  Citing what it believed were Plain-
tiffs’ blatantly contradictory positions, Colgate moved under Rule 11 and 
Rule 60(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for the entry of sanc-
tions, the imposition of monetary penalties, a disciplinary referral, and a va-
catur of the remand order.150  Plaintiffs attempted to resist this press, proffer-
 
 146. Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Joint Appendix at 474–76, Barlow, 772 
F.3d at 1005 (No. 13-1839(L)). 
 147. Id. (quoting Joint Appendix, supra note 146, at 494). 
 148. Brief for Defendant-Appellant Colgate-Palmolive Co., supra note 128, at 
*14.  The “glimmer-of-hope” reference was not idle hyperbole.  See id.  In the courts 
of the Fourth Circuit, the doctrine of fraudulent joinder is considered to be defeated 
by “only a slight possibility of a right to relief” or “a glimmer of hope” of relief.  
Mayes v. Rapoport, 198 F.3d 457, 466 (4th Cir. 1999). 
 149. Barlow, 772 F.3d at 1006. 
 150. Id. at 1006–07.  Rule 11 authorizes sanctions against a litigant who presents 
to the court any paper “for any improper purpose” or without supporting legal or 
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ing that the technical possibility of a meritorious claim against the non-
diverse defendants correctly defeated removal, even though Plaintiffs lacked 
both the factual support and the litigation desire to attempt to prove such 
claims: 
The truth is that the Plaintiffs in this case never represented to the fed-
eral court that it intended to generate evidence against any of the in-
state defendants, or even that they would prevail against the in-state 
defendants.  Indeed, such representations would have been irrelevant 
to the inquiry, because that is not what the federal standard requires.  
Instead, the Plaintiffs argued that there was a possibility that evidence 
could be generated or a possibility that the Plaintiffs could prevail 
against the local defendants, and that is all that is required to obtain 
remand in a fraudulent joinder argument.151 
Following argument, the federal court denied Colgate’s sanctions and 
vacatur motion.  Finding the motion’s allegations “substantial” and the com-
peting statements by Plaintiffs’ counsel to “appear to be in sharp conflict,” 
the court ruled nonetheless that the longstanding federal no-review prohibi-
tion on remand orders denied it jurisdiction to act.152  In closing, the court 
volunteered a further observation: were it not so constrained by the no-review 
prohibition, the court wrote that it would still have declined to impose sanc-
tions because the conflicting statements were “attributable to different attor-
neys in markedly different litigation contexts.”153  Colgate appealed.154 
 
factual basis.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(a)–(c).  Rule 60(b)(3) authorizes the court to 
relieve a party from any final judgment procured through fraud, misrepresentation, or 
misconduct.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(3).  Interestingly, Colgate sidestepped another 
legal recourse that may have been open to it – a second notice of removal, premised 
on the newly made statement by counsel during the State court consolidation hearing.  
See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3) (2012) (“[I]f the case stated by the initial pleading is not 
removable, a notice of removal may be filed within 30 days after receipt by the de-
fendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of an amended pleading, motion, 
order, or other paper from which it may first be ascertained that the case is one which 
is or has become removable.”).  See generally Benson v. SI Handling Sys., Inc., 188 
F.3d 780, 782 (7th Cir. 1999) (“Nothing in § 1446 forecloses multiple petitions for 
removal.”). 
 151. See Appellees’ Brief in Opposition, supra note 126, at *29. 
 152. Barlow, 772 F.3d at 1007. 
 153. Id.  To be sure, vacillating litigation advocacy is not always an exercise in 
deception.  Circumstances change, trial strategies evolve, litigation motivations shift.  
Plaintiffs here may have personally discounted their alternative source theories but, 
concerned that Colgate might press them (as it did), Plaintiffs may have wanted simp-
ly to ensure that other avenues for compensation remained in the case to hedge 
against how discovery would unfold.  The district judge may have appreciated all of 
this, and not been duped in the least.  Or the judge may have decided that the claims 
against the other defendants, though dubious and uncertain, were not so incredible as 
to risk the possibility of having later to confront the emergence of actual, bona fide 
claims against those non-diverse parties, with the ensuing obligation to belatedly 
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Meanwhile, back in state court, discovery in the two remanded cases 
proceeded apace.  Colgate evidently was busily constructing an alternative 
(non-Colgate) exposure record to defend Plaintiffs’ claims against the Col-
gate Cashmere Bouquet product.155  “Colgate can put on a case,” Plaintiffs 
quoted Colgate’s counsel as promising the state court judge, and Colgate “is 
going to be saying and is entitled to put on proof of these alternative expo-
sures. . . .  And we expect to produce substantial evidence, including of the 
alternative causes that these plaintiffs cited to the federal court.”156 
In federal court, the appellate process in the remand challenge was 
reaching its conclusion. 
B.  Barlow v. Colgate: The Fourth Circuit’s Ruling 
Initially, a divided three-judge panel voted to affirm the district court’s 
decision rejecting the remand challenge.157  Noting the extraordinary nature 
of the vacatur request by Colgate, facially contrary to the no-review prohibi-
tion on remand orders that has long prevailed in federal law, the panel majori-
ty observed: 
[N]o court has ever embraced the argument Colgate puts forward to-
day, and for a simple reason: it is a long-standing principle that entry 
of an order remanding a case to state court divests the district court “of 
all jurisdiction in [the] case and preclude[s] it from entertaining any 
further proceedings of any character, including the defendants’ motion 
to vacate the original remand order.”158   
Rejecting Colgate’s argument in the appeal, the panel majority held that Col-
gate’s pursuit of vacatur as a sanction “is, to put it simply, an anomaly in 
federal jurisdiction.”159 
 
remand.  On the other hand, the manner of advocacy and the particular syntax of the 
argument that was made may have crossed the line in a way that truly resulted in a 
fraud on the court – all of which validates the wisdom of the en banc panel to reserve 
the question of actual deception to the trial judge for resolution.  See infra note 169 
and accompanying text. 
 154. Barlow, 772 F.3d at 1009. 
 155. See Appellees’ Brief in Opposition, supra note 126, at *8–18.  See also id. at 
*11–12 (“What is interesting . . . is that Plaintiffs did not have any remediation evi-
dence to bolster its argument to this Court in the remand proceedings.  Colgate, 
‘through discovery,’ found that out on its very own. . . .  Colgate continued to argue 
that it could and would be able to prove the very exposures (the same exposures that it 
now claims [Plaintiffs’ counsel] fraudulently represented in federal court) were possi-
ble to prove to the federal court . . . .”). 
 156. Id. at *12 (emphasis omitted). 
 157. Barlow v. Colgate Palmolive Co., 750 F.3d 437, 442 (4th Cir.), rev’d and 
remanded, 772 F.3d 1001. 
 158. Id. at 442. 
 159. Id. 
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In a subsequent en banc rehearing, the Fourth Circuit shifted course, va-
cating the panel affirmance and substituting it with a ruling that now reversed 
and remanded the district court.160  The en banc ruling was also divided: six 
to reverse, one concurring in part and dissenting in part, and one to affirm.161  
The en banc majority opinion was written by Judge Henry F. Floyd, who had 
dissented from the earlier panel affirmance; the en banc dissent was written 
by Senior Judge Andre M. Davis, who had prepared the now-vacated panel 
affirmance.162 
The new en banc opinion held that the longstanding federal no-review 
prohibition on remand orders would not foreclose a vacatur of the remand 
order on the Barlow facts.163  The court explained that “vacating” a fraudu-
lently obtained remand order would not implicate the statutorily forbidden 
“review” of the underlying merits of the decision to remand.164  This distinc-
tion, explained the court, “is not merely semantic.”165  Only a merits “review” 
of remand orders is proscribed by Congress, not vacatur on the collateral 
ground of attorney misconduct.166  Because the district court enjoyed the ju-
risdictional authority to consider vacatur as a remedy for any misconduct 
found to have been committed by Plaintiffs, its jurisdictionally-based ruling 
had to be overturned.167  Furthermore, because the district court had labored 
under an errant jurisdictional conclusion, its cursory, closing surmise that 
would have rejected a sanctioned-based vacatur was dismissed by the Fourth 
Circuit as “mere dicta” entitled to “no weight.”168  Consequently, the en banc 
Fourth Circuit returned the matter to the district judge with instructions “to 
make specific findings – supported by cogent reasoning – on whether Plain-
tiffs engaged in misconduct while in federal court,” and whether Rule 11 
sanctions or a Rule 60(b)(3) vacatur was warranted.169 
 
 160. Barlow, 772 F.3d at 1007. 
 161. Id. at 1004. 
 162. Id. at 1004, 1007. 
 163. Id. at 1011. 
 164. Id. at 1010. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. at 1010–11. 
 167. Id. at 1011–12. 
 168. Id. at 1012. 
 169. Id.  It bears repeating here that the en banc court did not find that Plaintiffs or 
their attorneys misbehaved, that leveling sanctions against either of them was war-
ranted (or that sanction-supported cause existed) on the facts, or that a remand-for-
hoodwinking result was proper in this litigation.  To the contrary, the Fourth Circuit 
reserved such conclusions – at least in the first instance – to the district court itself, 
given that tribunal’s “familiarity with the issues and litigants” and its unique vantage 
point “better situated than us ‘to marshal the pertinent facts and apply the fact-
dependent legal standard mandated by Rule 11.’”  Id. at 1012–13.  The import of the 
Barlow decision is not that a vacatur of remand was warranted in that case for a re-
mand-by-hoodwinking, but rather its holding that a vacatur could be proper in any 
remand-by-hoodwinking circumstance.  Id. at 1010. 
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A scalding dissent from Judge Davis rebuked the en banc majority for 
“a new low” in reviewing the labor of trial judges.170  The en banc result, 
criticized the dissent, was “a blatant evasion” of the no-review directive – a 
holding that sister circuits were “unlikely” to follow and one the Supreme 
Court was almost certain to reject: “[T]his case is a first-round draft choice 
for summary reversal should plaintiffs choose not to go back to the district 
court to achieve the preordained results of the do-over unwisely ordered by 
the majority and instead file a petition for certiorari.”171 
Notwithstanding the sharp critique, the en banc decision stands now as 
the controlling law within the Fourth Circuit.  For the first time in any pub-
lished opinion, a federal court (and, indeed, an entire federal circuit sitting en 
banc) has held that Congress’s longstanding prohibition on reviews of re-
mand orders does not foreclose a vacatur when the deciding judge is hood-
winked. 
C.  Barlow v. Colgate: The Majority’s Rationale 
There is little doubt that the en banc Fourth Circuit majority understood 
the import of Congress’s no-review directive (“This statute generally pre-
cludes review of a remand order if the remand is for lack of subject-matter 
jurisdiction or for defects in the removal procedure”).172  Nor is there much 
doubt that the majority appreciated the prohibition’s underlying motivation 
(“This strict treatment serves the purposes of comity and judicial economy, as 
an action ‘must not ricochet back and forth depending upon the most recent 
determination of a federal court.’”).173 
But the Fourth Circuit also reasoned that when Congress crafted its no-
review statute, it selected the statute’s wording artfully.  “[C]ourts must pre-
sume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute 
what it says there.”174  The statutory language Congress wrote directed that 
federal remand orders are “not reviewable on appeal or otherwise.”175  That 
syntax, explained the court, was honed enough to permit a differentiation 
between “vacatur based on a contaminated process” and “review of a mo-
tion’s merits.”176  Colgate was foreclosed statutorily from seeking the latter (a 
review of the remand order’s merits), but free to pursue the former (a vacatur 
based on a corrupted decisional process): 
 
 170. Id. at 1015 (Davis, J., dissenting). 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. at 1007 (majority opinion) (citation omitted). 
 173. Id. at 1008 (citations omitted). 
 174. Id. at 1010 (quoting Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253–54 
(1992)). 
 175. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (2012). 
 176. Barlow, 772 F.3d at 1011. 
28
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 81, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 18
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol81/iss1/18
2016] REMANDS BY DECEPTION 103 
Colgate requests vacatur, not reconsideration.  And unlike reconsider-
ation, vacatur does not require reassessing the facts that were present-
ed to the district court at the time the cases were removed.  Again, 
Colgate only argues that Plaintiffs’ counsel misrepresented the actual 
facts of the case.  Colgate therefore attacks the manner by which 
Plaintiffs secured the remand orders, not the merits or correctness of 
the orders themselves.177 
In search of corroboration for its reasoning, the Fourth Circuit surveyed 
decisions from its sister circuits, two of whom had drawn similar distinctions 
– albeit in different remand contexts – between a “review” and a “vacatur”.178  
Both those opinions, reasoned the en banc panel, validated the court’s own 
distinction in Barlow between a reversal premised “on the remand’s merits” – 
an outcome squarely foreclosed by Congress’s “no-review” prohibition – and 
“vacatur based on a collateral consideration” (namely, “Colgate’s allegation 
that the remand orders were procured through attorney misconduct”).179  The 
Barlow majority acknowledged that three other circuits had ruled in brief, 
non-binding, unpublished opinions that the no-review prohibition would for-
bid the sort of vacatur the Fourth Circuit was now approving.180  But the 
Fourth Circuit found those rulings insubstantial and unpersuasive.181 
In the final analysis, the en banc majority was convinced: “[N]othing in 
the plain language” of Congress’s no-review statute “bars vacatur of the dis-
trict court’s remand orders if the court determines that such relief is warrant-
ed.  Although reconsideration is a subspecies of review, . . . vacatur, without 
revisiting a prior order’s merits, is no such cousin or relative.”182  Because the 
district court had misapprehended that it lacked jurisdiction to consider 
whether a vacatur grounded in litigant-initiated mischief was warranted, that 
decision was error and had to be overturned.183 
 
 177. Id. at 1012 (citations omitted).  See also id. at 1011 (explaining that a Rule 
60(b)(3) motion, “[r]ather than assess[ing] the merits of a judgment or order, . . . fo-
cuses on the unfair means by which a judgment or order is procured”); id. (citing 
Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 532 (2005)) (finding noteworthy the distinction 
drawn by the U.S. Supreme Court in Gonzalez v. Crosby, between a Rule 60(b) mo-
tion that attacks “some defect in the integrity” of the judicial process, and one that 
attacks “the substance of the federal court’s resolution of a claim on the merits”). 
 178. Id. at 1010–11 (citing Aquamar S.A. v. Del Monte Fresh Produce N.A., Inc., 
179 F.3d 1279, 1288 (11th Cir. 1999); Tramonte v. Chrysler Corp., 136 F.3d 1025, 
1028 (5th Cir. 1998)). 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. at 1011 (discussing Wachovia Mortg. FSB v. Marquez, 520 Fed. Appx. 
783, 785 (11th Cir. 2013) (per curiam); Ysais v. Ysais, 372 Fed. Appx. 843, 844 (10th 
Cir. 2010); Lindo v. Westlake Dev. Co., 100 F.3d 963, 1996 WL 654413, at *1 (9th 
Cir. 1996)). 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. at 1012. 
 183. Id. 
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III.  THE BEST GETAWAY RIDE EVER? 
The Barlow ruling is the latest chapter in the fascinating tale of the no-
review directive.  There is a fair measure of poetic symmetry in this first-ever 
judicial encounter with the question of deceptively-induced remands.  Un-
addressed for nearly 130 years, the Barlow drama befits the long wait: an 
intriguing factual record, a dismissive early affirmance, a divided en banc 
reversal, a heated dissent, and an ultimate rationale that chooses to navigate 
around, rather than except, the statutory prohibition. 
The no-review directive’s text appears unyielding.  That much is unde-
batable.  Yet Congress’s set of statutory exemptions and the Supreme Court’s 
group of decisional exclusions testify to a much more equivocal judgment.  
Congress’s legislative objective appears clear, yet its underlying policy goals 
seem, on inspection, less so.  Surely, Congress could not really have intended 
to insulate fraudulently-induced remands from adjustment, could they?  Yet, 
even if that wasn’t their intent, might that be the actual implementing effect 
of the statute Congress wrote?  Could it truly be the case that hoodwinked 
remands are the “perfect crime” in federal jurisdiction, with Section 1447(d) 
as the very best getaway ride ever? 
A.  The Starting Line: Statutory Plain Meaning 
Section 1447(d) is a federal statute, and as such, the method for constru-
ing it is well prescribed.  It is incumbent upon the courts to “give effect to the 
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”184  The first step (and poten-
tially last step) in statutory construction, then, is “the language of the statute 
itself.”185  If that statutory language “is plain, the sole function of the courts – 
at least where the disposition required by the text is not absurd – is to enforce 
it according to its terms.”186  The labor of statutory construction thus “ceases” 
when a statute’s language is found to be “unambiguous and the statutory 
 
 184. Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 665 
(2007) (quoting Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 
842–43 (1984)). 
 185. United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989).  See Ingalls 
Shipbuilding, Inc. v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 519 U.S. 248, 255 
(1997); Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917).  See also Levin v. Unit-
ed States, 133 S. Ct. 1224, 1231 (2013); Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 108 
(1990). 
 186. Sebelius v. Cloer, 133 S. Ct. 1886, 1896 (2013) (quoting Hartford Under-
writers Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 530 U.S. 1, 6 (2000)); Jimenez v. 
Quarterman, 555 U.S. 113, 118 (2009).  See also Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. 
Co., 560 U.S. 242, 251 (2010) (“We must enforce plain and unambiguous statutory 
language according to its terms.”); Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 600 (2009). 
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scheme is coherent and consistent.”187  In such a case, the courts “presume 
that Congress ‘means in a statute what it says there.’”188 
So, plain meaning is the start.  Does the no-review statute “plainly” ad-
dress the question of the proper fate for hoodwinked remands?  The statute 
reads, in full: 
An order remanding a case to the State court from which it was re-
moved is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise, except that an order 
remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed pursu-
ant to section 1442 or 1443 of this title shall be reviewable by appeal 
or otherwise.189   
Obviously, the statute does not speak specially to deceptively induced re-
mands.190  The plain meaning inquiry, then, devolves to this question: Can it 
be fairly said that deceptively-induced remands are – as a class of remands – 
plainly encompassed within the broad, general scope of non-“reviewable” 
orders the law so obviously proscribes? 
The answer to that question begins with the product and object of the 
hoodwinking.  What justification for remand was the district judge tricked 
into accepting, and in what type of case?  Some responses yield clear an-
swers.  By express statutory mandate, remands in certain categories of cases 
involving federal employees and agencies,191 civil rights claims,192 class ac-
tions,193 the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation,194 and the foreclosure or 
sale of tribal lands195 are reviewable.196  Likewise, remands on grounds other 
 
 187. Millbrook v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1441, 1446 (2013) (quoting Barnhart 
v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 450 (2002)). 
 188. Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253–54 (1992).  See also As-
grow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 513 U.S. 179, 187 (1995) (“When terms used in a stat-
ute are undefined, we give them their ordinary meaning.”); Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., 
Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 175–76 (2009) (quoting Engine Mfrs. Assn. v. S. Coast Air Quali-
ty Mgmt. Dist., 541 U.S. 246, 252 (2004)) (“Statutory construction must begin with 
the language employed by Congress and the assumption that the ordinary meaning of 
that language accurately expresses the legislative purpose.”). 
 189. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (2012).  For a discussion of the two explicit exemptions 
(Sections 1442 and 1443), see infra notes 191–92 and accompanying text. 
 190. See § 1447(d). 
 191. Id. § 1442. 
 192. Id. § 1443. 
 193. Id. § 1453(c). 
 194. 12 U.S.C. § 1819(b)(2)(C) (2012). 
 195. See 25 U.S.C. § 487(d) (2012) (Spokane Indian Reservation); id. at § 610c 
(Swinomish Indian Tribal Community); id. at § 642(b) (Hopi Industrial Park); id. at § 
670 (Southern Ute Indian Tribe). 
 196. To this list of express statutory exclusions may also be added context-
specific “antishuttling” statutes found to be “collid[ing] head on with § 1447(d),” and 
any other express statutory exclusion Congress may decide to grant.  Osborn v. Haley, 
549 U.S. 225, 243–44 (2007); see generally supra note 116 and accompanying text. 
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than a lack of subject matter jurisdiction or a timely-raised197 but nonjurisdic-
tional defect in removal procedure can be reviewed under the Supreme 
Court’s interpretative case law.198  Consequently, if the district court was 
deceptively coaxed into remanding one of those statutorily-exempted catego-
ries of cases or deceptively induced into remanding on a non-foreclosed 
ground, then review would be proper because, in those situations, it is always 
proper.199 
The vexing question arises in cases that fall into neither these statutori-
ly-exempted categories nor these non-foreclosed grounds.  More precisely: 
Can a deceptively-induced remand be reviewed when it was entered by a 
federal trial judge who was hoodwinked into doing so in a non-exempt litiga-
tion category – for either a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction or a timely-
asserted nonjurisdictional defect in removal procedure?  Those types of re-
mands are outside both Congress’s list of statutory exemptions200 and the 
Supreme Court’s list of decisional exclusions.201  Indeed, those types of re-
mands would seem, at first blush, to fall instead squarely within the prohibi-
tion zone.202 
Alas, the plain inquiry examination of Section 1447(d) does not lead to 
so straightforward a conclusion.  To the contrary, as one court has ably 
quipped, “‘[s]traightforward’ is about the last word judges attach to section 
1447(d) these days.”203  Determining whether a deceptively-induced remand 
order that falls seemingly within the no-review prohibition zone is reviewable 
or not hinges on how the statute’s phrase “not reviewable” is defined.  In 
other words, is the vacating of a deceptively-induced remand a “review” 
(squarely forbidden by Section 1447(d)), or is it something else entirely? 
 
 197. To fall within this excluded category, the remand must be based on a timely-
asserted, nonjurisdictional defect in removal procedure.  See Wittie, supra note 11, at 
113.  Untimely-asserted nonjurisdictional defects in removal procedure have, oddly, 
been found to be vulnerable to review under the Thermtron Products test.  Id. 
(“[C]ourts have held that section 1447(d) does not preclude review where a motion to 
remand based on defects in the removal is not made within the 30-day period.”). 
 198. See Thermtron Prods., Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336, 346 (1976) 
(permitting review of remand order based on court’s crowded docket, a justification 
found to be grounded neither in a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction nor a nonjurisdic-
tional defect in removal procedure).  For a fuller explanation of the Supreme Court’s 
in pari materia reading of Sections 1447(c) and 1447(d), and the narrowing effect of 
that construction, see supra note 117 and accompanying text. 
 199. Osborn, 549 U.S. at 243–44. 
 200. See supra notes 114–15 and accompanying text. 
 201. See supra notes 116–19 and accompanying text. 
 202. See Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Servs., Inc., 551 U.S. 224, 229–30 
(2007) (“[Section 1447(d)] preclude[s] review only of remands for lack of subject-
matter jurisdiction and for defects in removal procedure.”). 
 203. In re Amoco Petroleum Additives Co., 964 F.2d 706, 708 (7th Cir. 1992).  
See generally Wittie, supra note 11, at 120 (“The straightforward language of section 
1447(d) conceals a tangled thicket of rules and exceptions.”). 
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B.  The Meaning of the Phrase “Not Reviewable” 
In parsing the language of a statute, a settled principle of statutory con-
struction commands that its words be given their “ordinary meaning,”204 un-
less Congress supplies a different definition.205  In Section 1447(d), Congress 
included no statute-specific definition for “review” or “reviewable,” nor did it 
elsewhere supply a translegislative definition in the Dictionary Act (which, 
absent guidance otherwise, must be consulted “[i]n determining the meaning 
of any Act of Congress”).206  Consequently, in the absence of an expressed 
special definition, it is assumed “that the ordinary meaning of that language 
accurately expresses the legislative purpose.”207  Therefore, our examination 
must next consider the “ordinary meaning” in the English language of the 
word “reviewable” (or “review”).208 
In conducting a similar examination into “ordinary meaning,” the Su-
preme Court turned to certain legal and non-legal dictionaries as evaluative 
sources.209  Here, a similar consultation merits a try.  Black’s Law Dictionary 
defines “review” as: “To re-examine judicially or administratively[,] [a] re-
consideration; second view or examination; revision; consideration for pur-
 
 204. See Lawson v. FMR LLC, 134 S. Ct. 1158, 1165 (2014); Moskal v. United 
States, 498 U.S. 103, 108 (1990) (citation omitted).  See generally Sandifer v. U.S. 
Steel Corp., 134 S. Ct. 870, 876 (2014) (“It is a ‘fundamental canon of statutory con-
struction’ that, ‘unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their 
ordinary, contemporary, common meaning.’”). 
 205. See Sandifer v. U.S. Steel Corp., 134 S. Ct. 870, 877 (2014) (quoting Green-
leaf v. Goodrich, 101 U.S. 278, 284–85 (1880)) (noting that statutes may depart “from 
the natural and popular acceptation of language,” through text or context); Freeman v. 
Quicken Loans, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2034, 2042 (2012) (“[I]t is normal usage that, in the 
absence of contrary indication, governs our interpretation of texts.”); Schindler Eleva-
tor Corp. v. United States ex rel. Kirk, 131 S. Ct. 1885, 1891 (2011) (looking to the 
ordinary meaning of a statute’s words, because the statute did not otherwise define the 
operative terms). 
 206. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2768 (2014) 
(quoting 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2012)). 
 207. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 175–76 (2009) (quoting Engine 
Mfrs. Ass’n v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 541 U.S. 246, 252 (2004)). 
 208. See Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 513 U.S. 179, 187 (1995) (“When terms 
used in a statute are undefined, we give them their ordinary meaning”); Mohamad v. 
Palestinian Auth., 132 S. Ct. 1702, 1707 (2012) (“Congress remains free, as always, 
to give the word a broader or different meaning.  But before we will assume it has 
done so, there must be some indication Congress intended such a result.”).  See gen-
erally Rowland v. Cal. Men’s Colony, Unit II Men’s Advisory Council, 506 U.S. 194, 
200–01 (1993) (quoting McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc., 498 U.S. 479, 496 
(1991)) (“It is presumable that Congress legislates with knowledge of our basic rules 
of statutory construction.”). 
 209. See, e.g., Schindler Elevator Corp., 131 S. Ct. at 1891 (consulting Black’s 
Law Dictionary, the Oxford English Dictionary, Webster’s Third New International 
Dictionary, the American Heritage Dictionary, and the Random House Dictionary). 
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poses of correction.”210  Other dictionaries define “review” similarly.  The 
Oxford English Dictionary defines the term as: “To view, inspect, or examine 
a second time or again, . . . [t]o look over or through . . . in order to correct or 
improve, to revise, . . . [t]o submit (a decree, act, etc.) to examination or revi-
sion.”211  Webster’s New Universal Unabridged Dictionary defines the term 
as: “[T]o view again; to look at, look over, or study again, . . . to re-examine, 
specifically, to re-examine judicially, as a lower court’s decision.”212  The 
American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language offers: “To look 
over, study, examine again, . . . [t]o examine with an eye to criticism or cor-
rection, . . . [t]o reexamine (an action or determination) judicially, especially 
in a higher court, in order to correct possible errors.”213  The Random House 
Dictionary of the English Language defines “review” as: “[T]o view, look at, 
or look over again, . . . to reexamine judicially.”214 
Informed by these Court-credited sources and their expressions of the 
“ordinary meaning” of the term “review,” have we found a plain meaning 
answer?215  Is the vacating of a deceptively-induced remand a “review” and 
thereby foreclosed by the no-review directive of Section 1447(d)?  One could 
argue it is.  A vacatur of a deceptively-induced remand order could be seen as 
a “second . . . examination” (since the first “examination” was the erroneous-
ly entered one), a “revision” (through a “revising” of the former remand di-
rection), or a “consideration for purposes of correction” (because the purpose 
is a “correction” of the deception).  This application of the “ordinary mean-
ing” definitions, thus, could be seen to support a conclusion that a “vacatur” 
is a forbidden “review.” 
A dilemma here comes if the application of the same definitions will al-
so support the opposite, contrary conclusion just as readily.  And it does.  Is a 
vacating of a deceptively-induced remand really a “consideration” at all, or a 
“second time” look, a “look over,” or a “study again”?  To be precise, a vaca-
tur that merely negates a deceptively-induced remand order is not actually 
“reconsidering” or “re-examining” anything.  The merits and the legal reason-
ing undergirding the outcome are, in truth, never “re-”explored (at least not 
substantively so).  Instead, such a vacatur simplify nullifies, voids, and can-
cels the earlier remand order – all without any “reconsideration” or “re-
 
 210. Review, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1991). 
 211. 1 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 831 (2d ed. 1989). 
 212. WEBSTER’S NEW UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 1552 (2d ed. 1983).  
Webster’s offers no particularly helpful added guidance in defining “reviewable.”  
See id. (defined as “admitting of review; requiring review”). 
 213. AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1492 (4th ed. 
2000). 
 214. THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1227 (1983). 
 215. See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997) (emphasis added) 
(“Our first step in interpreting a statute is to determine whether the language at issue 
has a plain and unambiguous meaning with regard to the particular dispute in the 
case.”). 
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examination” of the soundness or correctness of the remand ruling.216  In 
point of fact, a vacated order does not get “corrected”; it simply disappears.  
Couldn’t that just as snugly demonstrate that “vacatur” is nothing like “re-
view”? 
The Fourth, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits seem to concur that this latter 
reading is more faithful to Congress’s choice of language.217  Each of these 
courts of appeals appears inclined to reason that a vacatur (whether of a de-
ceptively-induced remand order or otherwise) might well not constitute a 
forbidden “review.”  A careful consideration of those courts’ logic proves that 
their reasoning is not easily dismissed as sophistry. 
The en banc Fourth Circuit in Barlow, the nation’s only appellate deci-
sion squarely confronting the spectre of a deceptively-induced remand,218 
began by incanting the mantra that “courts must presume that a legislature 
says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there.”219  
The court then expounded its distinction between “vacatur based on a con-
taminated process” and “review of a motion’s merits.”220  The court reasoned 
that the no-review directive statutorily forecloses only the latter (a review of 
the remand order’s merits), and not the former (a vacatur based on a corrupt-
ed decisional process): “[U]nlike reconsideration, vacatur does not require 
reassessing the facts that were presented to the district court at the time the 
cases were removed.”221  Where a vacatur motion isolates exclusively on 
purposeful, calculated misrepresentations about the facts of a case, the motion 
“attacks the manner by which Plaintiffs secured the remand orders, not the 
merits or correctness of the orders themselves.”222  The en banc court rea-
soned, “nothing in the plain language” of Congress’s no-review statute “bars 
 
 216. See Vacate, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 210 (defining “vacate” 
as: “To annul; to set aside; to cancel or rescind[,] [t]o render an act void; as, to vacate 
an entry of record, or a judgment”); AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE 
ENGLISH LANGUAGE, supra note 213, at 1897 (same, as: “To make void or annul; 
countermand”); 1 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 211, at 385 (same, as: 
“To make void in law; to deprive of legal authority or validity; to annul or cancel”); 
THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, supra note 214, at 
1227 (same, as: “[T]o render inoperative; deprive of validity; void; annul”). 
 217. Barlow v. Colgate Palmolive Co., 772 F.3d 1001, 1010–11 (4th Cir. 2014). 
 218. Though again, to be precise, the Fourth Circuit confronted merely the conse-
quences of a theoretically deceptively-induced remand ruling, expressly reserving to 
the trial judge the right to pass factually (at least in the first instance) on whether the 
circumstances at issue there qualified for vacatur.  Id. at 1012–13.  As discussed be-
low, the trial judge, following the case’s return from the Fourth Circuit, held that no 
vacatur was warranted.  See infra notes 315–18. 
 219. Barlow, 772 F.3d at 1010 (quoting Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 
249, 253–54 (1992)). 
 220. Id. at 1011. 
 221. Id. at 1012.  See also id. at 1011 (explaining that a Rule 60(b)(3) motion, 
“[r]ather than assess[ing] the merits of a judgment or order, . . . focuses on the unfair 
means by which a judgment or order is procured”). 
 222. Id. at 1012. 
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vacatur of the district court’s remand orders if the court determines that such 
relief is warranted.223  Although reconsideration is a subspecies of review, 
vacatur, without revisiting a prior order’s merits, is no such cousin or rela-
tive.”224  Because the trial court had misapprehended that it lacked jurisdic-
tion to consider whether a vacatur grounded in litigant-initiated mischief was 
warranted, that decision was error and had to be overturned.225 
In a different but still analytically valuable discussion, the Fifth Circuit 
discovered that it had authority to vacate a district court’s remand order if 
entered by a judge who ought to have recused from even considering the re-
mand motion in the first place.226  There, the Fifth Circuit employed a similar 
review-versus-vacatur dichotomy to support its result: “Our vacatur of the 
remand order” does not “constitute a review of the merits of that order” when 
the court merely “perform[s] an essentially ministerial task of vacating an 
order that the district court had no authority to enter for reasons unrelated to 
the order of remand itself.”227 
Likewise, the Eleventh Circuit embraced a similar analysis in holding 
that a federal court’s dismissal of a foreign government agency on sovereign 
immunity grounds (with resulting remand of the remaining defendants back 
to state court) was reviewable on appeal, notwithstanding the proscription of 
the no-review directive.228  There, the Eleventh Circuit explained: “To ‘re-
 
 223. Id. 
 224. Id. (citation omitted). 
 225. Id. 
 226. Tramonte v. Chrysler Corp., 136 F.3d 1025 (5th Cir. 1998). 
 227. Id. at 1028. 
 228. See generally Aquamar S.A. v. Del Monte Fresh Produce N.A., Inc., 179 
F.3d 1279 (11th Cir. 1999).  The Aquamar decision involved a claim of foreign state 
immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1602–
11.  Id. at 1282.  Eight years after Aquamar was decided, the Supreme Court consid-
ered an appeal contending, among other things, that appellate review was proper over 
orders remanding lawsuits involving purported foreign government entities denied 
sovereign immunity treatment under the FSIA, notwithstanding Section 1447(d), 
since “Congress could not have intended to grant district judges irrevocable authority 
to decide questions with such sensitive foreign-relations implications.”  Powerex 
Corp. v. Reliant Energy Servs., Inc., 551 U.S. 224, 236–37 (2007).  The Court reject-
ed this argument, holding that courts must take the no-review directive “seriously, 
however pressing the merits of the appeal might seem,” and that therefore Section 
1447(d) “bars appellate consideration of petitioner’s claim that it is a foreign state for 
purposes of the FSIA.”  Id. at 238–39.  The Supreme Court in Powerex Corp. did not 
confront the particular review-versus-vacatur reasoning that persuaded the Eleventh 
Circuit in Aquamar, so the Eleventh Circuit’s decision remains technically undis-
turbed.  Candor compels acknowledgement, however, that the sweeping language of 
Powerex Corp. at least seems to undermine (if not flatly contradict) the ultimate out-
come the Eleventh Circuit reached in Aquamar.  See id. at 237–38 (citation omitted) 
(“We are well aware that § 1447(d)’s immunization of erroneous remands has unde-
sirable consequences in the FSIA context. . . .  But whether that special concern out-
weighs § 1447(d)’s general interest in avoiding prolonged litigation on threshold 
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view’ an order, a court must do more than merely cancel it; it must, to some 
extent, examine it and determine its merits.”229  Conversely, if an appeals 
court orders a district judge simply “to vacate an order for reasons that do not 
involve a reconsideration or examination of its merits, then we have not ‘re-
viewed’ the order, and therefore have not fallen afoul of [Congress’s] prohibi-
tion on review.”230 
This theoretical possibility that a vacatur of a deceptively-induced re-
mand does not reflexively constitute a “review” also finds some support in 
the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence.  In the context of examining whether a 
Rule 60(b) motion for relief from a judgment qualified as an improper suc-
cessive habeas corpus petition, the Court acknowledged the distinction be-
tween a “proper”231 Rule 60(b) motion – which attacks “some defect in the 
integrity” of the judicial process – and an improper one – which attacks “the 
substance of the federal court’s resolution of a claim on the merits.”232  In-
deed, this distinction between “an attempt to relitigate the case” and a fraud 
that “prevented the moving party from fully and fairly presenting his case” 
has long been recognized in the law.233 
Notably, three other court of appeals panels – from the Ninth, Tenth, 
and Eleventh Circuits – considered the fitness of Rule 60(b) as a tool for va-
cating an erroneous remand order, and each panel rejected it.234  Only the 
Fourth Circuit in Barlow expressly weighed the impact of those three deci-
sions in the deceptively-induced remand context, and that en banc court 
found them unpersuasive – emphasizing that each ruling was unpublished, 
non-precedential, litigated pro se, supported by only “minimal analysis,” and 
lacking a consideration of “what relief under Rule 60(b)(3) can entail,” name-
 
nonmerits questions is a policy debate that belongs in the halls of Congress, not in the 
hearing room of this Court.  As far as the Third Branch is concerned, what the text of 
§ 1447(d) indisputably does prevails over what it ought to have done.”). 
 229. Aquamar, 179 F.3d at 1288. 
 230. Id. 
 231. Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 538 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 232. Id. at 532. 
 233. 11 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 
2860, at 412–24 (3d ed. 2012).  See generally Apotex Corp. v. Merck & Co., 507 F.3d 
1357, 1360–61 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“Fraud upon the court is typically limited to egre-
gious events such as bribery of a judge or juror or improper influence exerted on the 
court, affecting the integrity of the court and its ability to function impartially.”); 
Lonsdorf v. Seefeldt, 47 F.3d 893, 898 (7th Cir. 1995) (“Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(3) an 
escape valve to protect the fairness and integrity of litigation in federal courts.”); In re 
Whitney–Forbes, Inc., 770 F.2d 692, 698 (7th Cir. 1985) (quoting Bulloch v. United 
States, 721 F.2d 713, 718 (10th Cir. 1983)) (“‘Fraud on the court involves a particular 
type of fraud which is directed to the judicial machinery itself,’ and which involves 
circumstances where the impartial functions of the court have been directly corrupt-
ed.”). 
 234. See Lindo v. Westlake Dev. Co., 100 F.3d 963, 963 (9th Cir. 1996); Ysais v. 
Ysais, 372 Fed. Appx. 843, 844 (10th Cir. 2010); Wachovia Mortg. FSB v. Marquez, 
520 Fed. Appx. 783, 785 (11th Cir. 2013) (per curiam). 
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ly a “vacatur based on a contaminated process.”235  On closer inspection, 
each of these three decisions does seem to suggest that the vacatur motions 
there involved attacks on the underlying logic, reasoning, and substantive 
analysis of the deciding court (true merits “reconsideration” requests), and 
not summary annulments of the remand orders as illegitimately entered.236  If 
that is a proper reading of those three opinions (and it seems it is), then those 
rulings are not at all in conflict with the reasoning from Barlow and its sister 
circuits when they detect a dispositive, substantive difference between “vaca-
tur” and “review”. 
Drawn from this body of decisional law, then, a distinction takes form– 
one that squares with the “plain meaning” definition of the term “review.”  At 
one pole lies the species of decision that vacates based on “a contaminated 
process,”237 which, by virtue of “an essentially ministerial task,”238 focused 
solely on “the manner” by which it was secured,239 results in the contested 
ruling being “merely cancel[ed].”240  Guided by our “plain meaning” explora-
tion, this would seem not to qualify as “reconsideration” or “re-
examination.”241  At the opposite analytical pole lies the species of decision 
that vacates based on a second-look into the substantive “merits or correct-
ness”242 of a judicial order by, “to some extent, examin[ing] it and deter-
min[ing] its merits,”243 thereby “reassessing the facts that were presented to 
the district court.”244  That would seem to qualify squarely as the “reconsider-
ation” and “re-examination” that aligns with the ordinary meaning of “re-
view.”  In the end, application of the “plain meaning” inquiry – informed by 
the “ordinary meaning” prescription – at least exposes the word “review” as 
vulnerable to this different, substantively competing meaning in the context 
of the vacatur of a deceptively-induced remand.245  Thus, this interpretive 
journey must continue on. 
 
 235. Barlow v. Colgate Palmolive Co., 772 F.3d 1001, 1011 (4th Cir. 2014). 
 236. See Lindo, 100 F.3d at 963 (describing motion as one “for reconsideration”); 
Ysais, 372 Fed. Appx. at 844 (describing motion as one “again requesting that the 
district court take jurisdiction over the case”); Marquez, 520 Fed. Appx. at 784 (de-
scribing motion as one “filing objections to the remand order” and “requesting to 
cancel the order to remand the case”). 
 237. Barlow, 772 F.3d at 1011. 
 238. Tramonte v. Chrysler Corp., 136 F.3d 1025, 1028 (5th Cir. 1998). 
 239. Barlow, 772 F.3d at 1012. 
 240. Aquamar S.A. v. Del Monte Fresh Produce N.A., Inc., 179 F.3d 1279, 1288 
(11th Cir. 1999). 
 241. See supra notes 211–19 and accompanying text. 
 242. Barlow, 772 F.3d at 1012. 
 243. Aquamar, 179 F.3d at 1288. 
 244. Barlow, 772 F.3d at 1012.  See also Tramonte v. Chrysler Corp., 136 F.3d 
1025, 1028 (5th Cir. 1998). 
 245. See Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 
COLUM. L. REV. 527, 528 (1947) (“The problem derives from the very nature of 
words.  They are symbols of meaning.  But unlike mathematical symbols, the phras-
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C.  Construing the Phrase “Not Reviewable” to Achieve Congress’s 
Intent 
Had a “plain meaning” inquiry supplied the dispositive definitional con-
tent for the phrase “not reviewable,” settled tenets of statutory construction 
would bar the courts’ “liberty to add an exception in order to remove apparent 
hardship in particular cases” of remands that had been deceptively induced.246  
The courts would have been prohibited by their proper role in our govern-
ment of three branches from disturbing such remand orders, notwithstanding 
that those orders were extracted through a deliberate, calculated misrepresen-
tation designed to hoodwink the decisionmaker into acting.  The profoundly 
disquieting result of tolerating such an intentional undermining of the “judi-
cial machinery itself”247 would have been irremediable by statutory edict.248  
But the “plain meaning” journey unearthed no such definitive content for the 
phrase “not reviewable,” at least not unambiguously so.249  The task of statu-
tory construction then marches on.250 
Where, as here, the language of a statute “seem[s] insufficiently pre-
cise,” offering “little assistance” in the particular interpretive task before the 
court, “the ‘natural way’ to draw the line ‘is in light of the statutory pur-
 
ing of a document, especially a complicated enactment, seldom attains more than 
approximate precision.”). 
 246. Corona Coal Co. v. United States, 263 U.S. 537, 540 (1924) (“But the words 
of the statute are plain, with nothing in the context to make their meaning doubtful; no 
room is left for construction . . . .”). 
 247. In re Whitney-Forbes, Inc., 770 F.2d 692, 698 (7th Cir. 1985) (quoting 
Bulloch v. United States, 721 F.2d 713, 718 (10th Cir. 1983)). 
 248. See Dodd v. United States, 545 U.S. 353, 359–60 (2005) (“Although we 
recognize the potential for harsh results in some cases, we are not free to rewrite the 
statute that Congress has enacted.”); Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656, 663 n.5 (2001) 
(“[E]ven if we disagreed with the legislative decision to establish stringent procedural 
requirements for retroactive application of new rules, we do not have license to ques-
tion the decision on policy grounds.”); Helvering v. N.Y. Trust Co., 292 U.S. 455, 
464 (1934) (“The rule that, where the statute contains no ambiguity, it must be taken 
literally and given effect according to its language, is a sound one not to be put aside 
to avoid hardships that may sometimes result from giving effect to the legislative 
purpose.”). 
 249. See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997) (“The plainness or 
ambiguity of statutory language is determined by reference to the language itself, the 
specific context in which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute 
as a whole.”). 
 250. See generally Frankfurter, supra note 245, at 527–28 (“When we talk of 
statutory construction we have in mind cases in which there is a fair contest between 
two readings, neither of which comes without respectable title deeds.  A problem in 
statutory construction can seriously bother courts only when there is a contest be-
tween probabilities of meaning.”). 
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pose.’”251  Only in this way can the court be sure to “give to [the statute] such 
a construction as will carry into execution the will of the Legislature.”252  But 
this task is often mired in doubt.  As Justice Cardozo once remarked as he 
embarked upon statutory construction: “Here as so often there is a choice 
between uncertainties.  We must be content to choose the lesser.”253 
On the question of vacating a deceptively induced remand order, what 
then is the lesser uncertain choice?  Which approach best “carries into execu-
tion the will of the Legislature”? 
The legislative record appears to reflect two congressional objectives 
animating the no-review directive – to rescue the Supreme Court (and, per-
haps, subsequent federal appellate courts) from a buffeting caseload,254 and to 
avoid “prolonged litigation of questions of jurisdiction” with their resultant 
delay, cost, and federalism irritation.255  Both of those purposes are achieved 
most robustly by an absolute, unyielding construction of the no-review di-
rective: that no review of any remand order ever be permitted; that instanta-
neously upon the federal court’s pronouncement of a remand, the cause is 
whisked back to state court where it remains undisturbed until final disposi-
tion there.  But Congress diluted such an absolutist objective (if it had one) by 
its own pen,256 and the Supreme Court eroded that objective with its series of 
judicially-crafted encroachments.257 
Perhaps this hollowing of the seemingly absolutist language of Section 
1447(d) reflects the Court’s own interpretive maxim that “it frustrates rather 
than effectuates legislative intent simplistically to assume that whatever fur-
 
 251. United States v. Article of Drug . . . Bacto-Unidisk . . ., 394 U.S. 784, 799 
(1969). 
 252. Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642, 650 (1974) (quoting Brown v. Duchesne, 
60 U.S. 183, 194 (1857)).  See also Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 315 
(1980) (“[O]ur obligation is to take statutes as we find them, guided, if ambiguity 
appears, by the legislative history and statutory purpose.”). 
 253. Burnet v. Guggenheim, 288 U.S. 280, 288 (1933). 
 254. See supra note 90. 
 255. United States v. Rice, 327 U.S. 742, 751 (1946).  See supra notes 91–98 and 
accompanying text. 
 256. See supra notes 114–15 and accompanying text (listing the various statutory 
exemptions Congress enacted to the no-review directive). 
 257. See supra notes 116–19 and accompanying text (listing Court opinions rec-
ognizing exemptions to the no-review directive).  Spirited objections to this judicial 
erosion have been hurled along the way.  See Osborn v. Haley, 549 U.S. 225, 263 
(2007) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Today’s opinion eviscerates what little remained of 
Congress’s Court-limiting command.”); Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 
343, 359 (1988) (White, J., dissenting) (“There is no statutory basis for this holding. . 
. .  This result is inconsistent with Congress’ understanding of the federal courts’ 
remand authority as well as with the precedents of this Court.”); Thermtron Prods., 
Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336, 354 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citation 
omitted) (“I think it plain that Congress, which has unquestioned authority to do so 
has expressly prohibited the review sought”).  But those entreaties caused no retreat 
from the Justices in those majorities. 
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thers the statute’s primary objective must be the law.”258  Indeed, the Court’s 
decisions implicitly reflect a type of recurring “must-have-meant” treatment 
of Congress’s no-review directive, as where a majority of the Justices drew 
the inferences that the legislature must have meant to exclude Westfall Act 
remands,259 pendent jurisdiction remands,260 supplemental jurisdiction re-
mands,261 and abstention remands262 from its no-review prohibition.  The 
very fountainhead to this parade of judicial exceptions, Thermtron Products, 
Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, squares with an implicit “must-have-meant” approach 
to the no-review direction when the Court there refused to construe Section 
1447(d) “so woodenly” to “extinguish” a court’s power – “not touching the 
propriety of the removal” – “to correct a district court that has not merely 
erred” but remanded on grounds that were unspecified by statute.263  This 
rejection of a “wooden[]” construction of the no-review directive that would 
have, without “touching the propriety” of the contested removal, corrected a 
district court ruling that had not “merely erred,” but remanded in an unauthor-
ized manner, is telling.264  The Fourth Circuit’s decision in Barlow to author-
ize review of a hoodwinked remand order,265 the Fifth Circuit’s decision to 
permit review of a recusal-error remand order,266 and the Eleventh Circuit’s 
decision to allow review of a foreign government immunity remand order267 
all tend to align with this “must-have-meant” approach to Section 1447(d).  
At the very least, they illustrate the reluctance among the courts of appeals to 
construe the no-review directive “woodenly” when doing so flies against their 
considered sense of Congress’s legislative purpose. 
To be clear, the Supreme Court’s tolerance for “must-have-meant” con-
structions of the no-review directive is hardly unbounded.  In 2007, seven 
Justices refused to conjure a judicial exception to Section 1447(d) that would 
have permitted review of remands from determinations that entities did not 
qualify as a “foreign state” for purposes of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities 
 
 258. Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522, 526 (1987) (per curiam). 
 259. Osborn, 549 U.S. 225 (reviewing a remand based on Westfall Act immunity 
rulings). 
 260. Cohill, 484 U.S. at 351 (reviewing a remand based on inappropriateness of 
continuing to exercise pendent jurisdiction). 
 261. Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U.S. 635 (2009) (reviewing a re-
mand based on declination of supplemental jurisdiction). 
 262. Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706 (1996) (reviewing a remand 
based on abstention principles). 
 263. Thermtron Prods., Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336, 352 (1976). 
 264. See id. 
 265. See supra notes 156 & 216–24 and accompanying text. 
 266. See supra notes 225–28 and accompanying text. 
 267. See supra notes 227–29 and accompanying text.  For a discussion of how the 
Eleventh Circuit’s opinion aligns with a later decision from the Supreme Court, see 
supra note 228–30 and accompanying text. 
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Act.268  They denied relief, even though doing so portended possible serious 
damage to the nation’s foreign relations.269  The Court explained: 
[W]hether that specific concern outweighs § 1447(d)’s general interest 
in avoiding prolonged litigation on threshold nonmerits question is a 
policy debate that belongs in the halls of Congress, not in the hearing 
room of this Court.  As far as the Third Branch is concerned, what the 
text of § 1447(d) indisputably does prevails over what it ought to have 
done.270 
A year earlier, the Court resisted an invitation to devise a review path 
for remands under the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act, empha-
sizing that it has “relentlessly repeated” that the no-review directive applies 
“whether or not that [remand] order might be deemed erroneous by an appel-
late court.”271  A decade earlier, the Court rebuffed an effort to excuse bank-
ruptcy remands from the no-review directive, concluding that “there is no 
reason” why that directive and the bankruptcy laws “cannot comfortably co-
exist.”272 
But a remand order that has been deceptively induced is a qualitatively 
different type of remand order than the Court has yet confronted.  None of its 
prior precedents explored a remand order that was the product of a corrupted 
judicial process.  That distinction is critical.  Routine remand orders, whether 
they be correct, debatable, wrong, unreasoned, or even “manifestly errone-
ous,” are still the products of legitimate judicial deliberation.  The litigants 
have been afforded an opportunity to express their views of the remand ques-
tion, have been heard, and the district judge, having weighed the competing 
arguments, has settled on a considered decision.  A legitimate, bona fide judi-
cial act has occurred.  The district court may have gotten it unquestionably 
right or abysmally wrong, but it has truly gotten its “one shot.”273 
Deception sabotages this process, converting it from fair to illegitimate, 
from a bona fide judicial act to an invalidly commandeered one.  Indeed, as 
one court lucidly cast it: “[A] decision produced by fraud on the court is not 
 
 268. Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Servs., Inc., 551 U.S. 224 (2007). 
 269. See id. at 237 (citation omitted) (“A foreign sovereign defendant whose case 
is wrongly remanded is denied not only the federal forum to which it is entitled . . . , 
but also certain procedural rights that the FSIA specifically provides foreign sover-
eigns only in federal court (such as the right to a bench trial).”); id. at 239 (Kennedy 
& Alito, JJ., concurring) (“[I]t is troubling to be required to issue a decision that 
might well frustrate a policy of importance to our own Government.”). 
 270. Id. at 237–38 (majority opinion) (citation omitted). 
 271. Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust, 547 U.S. 633, 640 (2006) (quoting 
Thermtron Prods., Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336, 351 (1976)). 
 272. Things Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca, 516 U.S. 124, 129 (1995). 
 273. In re La Providencia Dev. Corp., 406 F.2d 251, 253 (1st Cir. 1969) (“The 
district court has one shot, right or wrong.”). 
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in essence a decision at all.”274  A sabotaged process “demands the exercise 
of the historic power of equity to set aside fraudulently begotten judg-
ments.”275  So exceptional an intervention is appropriate since “tampering 
with the administration of justice . . . is a wrong against the institutions set up 
to protect and safeguard the public, institutions in which fraud cannot com-
placently be tolerated consistently with the good order of society.”276   This is 
an “inherent power” of the courts, and one they have long possessed.277  
While such power can certainly be constrained to a degree by Congress 
through its statutes, such a result is not to be “lightly assume[d].”278 
In the face of the mischief of deceptively-induced remands, Section 
1447(d) ought to stand as no obstacle – notwithstanding its seemingly broad 
linguistic sweep.  Consider, for example, a judge who was forcibly coerced 
into entering a remand order at gunpoint, or on threat to her life or the safety 
of her family.  Surely, no one would contend that Congress’s no-review di-
rective is so numbingly inflexible that it would shield that remand order from 
being vacated.  Likewise, no remand order procured through bribery could 
scurry behind Section 1447(d) for cover, nor could one forged with the unau-
thorized signature of the presiding judge.  Those results are (presumably) 
incontestable.  And a principled reasoning explains why – none of those re-
mand orders would have been the product of legitimate judicial deliberation; 
none was a bona fide judicial act.  The Second Circuit made a related point 
long ago when, in a bribery case against a sitting judge, it rebuffed the de-
fense’s contention that no wrong could be found unless the decisions the 
bribed judge made were, in fact, actually legally incorrect.279  Whether the 
bribed judge’s decisions were legally sound or not is “immaterial,” explained 
the court; indeed, the court assumed, for its purposes, that all matters “were in 
fact rightly decided.”280  That was all quite beside the point, reasoned the 
court: “Judicial action, whether just or unjust, right or wrong, is not for 
sale[.]”281 
 
 274. Kenner v. Comm’r, 387 F.2d 689, 691 (7th Cir. 1968).  Cf. United States v. 
Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61, 66 (1878) (when fraud or deception has been practiced, 
“there has never been a real contest in the trial or hearing of the case”). 
 275. Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 245 (1944). 
 276. Id. at 246. 
 277. See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 44 (1991).  See also Chevron 
Corp. v. Donziger, 974 F. Supp. 2d 362, 555 & n.1264 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (noting that 
courts have recognized their power to refuse the enforcement of rulings obtained 
through fraud “at least since the seventeenth century”). 
 278. See Chambers, 501 U.S. at 47. 
 279. See United States v. Manton, 107 F.2d 834, 846 (2d Cir. 1939). 
 280. Id. 
 281. Id.  See also Donziger, 974 F. Supp. 2d at 564–65 (footnote omitted) (no 
showing that outcome was actually affected is necessary, since “[i]n cases in which 
the tribunal has been corrupted, ‘no worthwhile interest is served in protecting the 
judgment’”). 
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Voiding deceptively-induced remand orders (like the voiding of bribed, 
forged, or coerced remand orders) comports with Section 1447(d), not be-
cause the courts are, ultra viresly, brewing up some new judicial concoction 
to ladle into this already churning caldron of precedent, but because the de-
ceptively-induced orders are not being “reviewed” at all.  They are being 
“cancelled,” “annulled,” and “rescinded” – without any inspection of their 
underlying merits.  Their correctness or their error is left unexamined.  The 
mischief Congress sought to foreclose, namely, the specter of ricocheting 
jurisdiction as litigants fight substantively – up and down each judicial sys-
tem – over the place of tribunal, 282 is not defeated.  This is so because, in the 
context of deceptively-induced remands, the wheels of justice did not spin 
true the first time.  The deception (on which the remand was based) “defiles 
the court,” and like any such undermining of the rightful progress of the judi-
cial machinery, it commands relief283 – to which ordinary, routine procedural 
barriers (even seemingly impregnable ones) must give way.  In its hornbook 
decision applying fraud-on-the-court principles, the Supreme Court wisely 
instructed: “The public welfare demands that the agencies of public justice be 
not so impotent that they must always be mute and helpless victims of decep-
tion and fraud.”284 
Corroboration for this conclusion comes from two further sources. 
First, since their amendment in 1948, the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure have confirmed the authority of federal courts to “relieve a party or a 
party’s legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for . . 
. fraud.”285  The Rules have likewise confirmed that the courts’ power to en-
tertain “an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order, or 
proceeding . . . or . . . to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court” is ex-
pressly preserved.286  Exercising the right to grant such relief would be in-
compatible with an absolutist, unyielding construction of Section 1447(d).  
The two laws would collide.  The longstanding approach to resolving con-
flicts between a federal procedural rule and a federal statute teaches that the 
more recent in time prevails.287  Because Congress delegated rules-of-practice 
 
 282. See supra notes 91–102 and accompanying text. 
 283. See Dixon v. Comm’r, 316 F.3d 1041, 1046 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting England 
v. Doyle, 281 F.2d 304, 309 (9th Cir. 1960) (“When we conclude that the integrity of 
the judicial process has been harmed . . . and the fraud rises to the level of ‘an uncon-
scionable plan or scheme which is designed to improperly influence the court in its 
decisions,’ we not only can act, we should.”).  See generally WRIGHT ET AL., supra 
note 233, at 575–76 (“If it is found that there was a fraud on the court, the judgment 
must be vacated and the guilty party denied all relief.”). 
 284. Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 246 (1944). 
 285. FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(3) (as amended Mar. 19, 1948). 
 286. Id. at 60(d)(3). 
 287. See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 306 F.3d 231, 236 (5th Cir. 2002), over-
ruled on other grounds, 364 F.3d 578, 586 (5th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (“[W]e have 
recognized that where a conflict exists between a Rule and a statute, the most recent 
of the two prevails.”); Harris v. Garner, 216 F.3d 970, 982 (11th Cir. 2000) (“[T]he 
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promulgation authority to the Supreme Court in the Rules Enabling Act, 
Congress’s lawmaking authority over rules-of-practice remains “integral,” 
and therefore the conflicting procedural rule and congressional statute would 
stand on equally authoritative footing.288  This comparative dating exercise 
would relate the no-review directive’s initial enactment (1887) to the relevant 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure amendment (1948).289  Consequently, were 
 
rule would have to yield to the later-enacted statute to the extent of the conflict.”); 
United States v. Hinton, No. 99-1340, 2000 WL 717085, at *1 (10th Cir. 2000) (“Alt-
hough there are relatively few instances in which the federal courts have been called 
upon to address a conflict between a federal rule of criminal procedure and a more 
recently enacted federal statute, in every case, the more recent statute has been found 
to modify the rule of criminal procedure.”).  See generally Bernadette Bollas Genetin, 
The Powers That Be: A Reexamination of the Federal Courts’ Rulemaking and Adju-
dicatory Powers in the Context of A Clash of A Congressional Statute and A Supreme 
Court Rule, 57 BAYLOR L. REV. 587, 600–01 (2005) (“The federal courts have tradi-
tionally resolved statute-Rule conflicts under the supersession clause in accord with 
the later-in-time analysis of the canon of statutory interpretation that disfavors im-
plied repeal of existing statutes.  Thus, under the supersession clause, courts have 
permitted a later-promulgated Federal Rule to supersede existing federal statutes to 
the extent that there was an irreconcilable conflict between the two.”). 
 288. See Wilson, 306 F.3d at 236.  Professor Bernadette Bollas Genetin has ex-
plored the question of federal rule/federal statute clash theory in fascinating detail.  
She explains the traditional rationale for how statutes enacted by Congress could be 
negated by a procedural rule promulgated by the Supreme Court: “Ultimately, the 
legislators accepted an analysis that Congress was, by enactment of the Rules Ena-
bling Act, which itself was subject to bicameralism and presentment, pre-authorizing 
the Supreme Court to take subsequent action to repeal congressional legislation re-
garding procedure.”  Genetin, supra note 287, at 605.  Though noting this historical 
legacy, Professor Genetin advocates a more searching inquiry into the relative author-
ity of the respective lawmaker (judiciary or legislature).  See Bernadette Bollas Ge-
netin, Expressly Repudiating Implied Repeals Analysis: A New Framework for Re-
solving Conflicts Between Congressional Statutes and Federal Rules, 51 EMORY L.J. 
677, 727 (2002) (“The principal focus in resolving statute-Rule conflicts should be on 
inquiries specifically tailored to resolve which rulemaker--the Court or Congress--has 
the authority to create the procedural standards in the specific context.”). 
 289. The no-review directive was first enacted in 1887.  See supra notes 109–12 
and accompanying text.  The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were amended in 1948 
to add fraud to the list of reasons justifying relief from a judgment or order and to 
confirm the authority to “set aside a judgment for fraud on the court.”  See FED. R. 
CIV. P. 60(b) (as amended Mar. 19, 1948).  That is not to say that the no-review di-
rective has remained fixed and unamended over the years.  It has not.  First, particular 
statutory exemptions have been added and deleted to the directive over the years.  See 
supra notes 114–15 and accompanying text.  Second, the original act had contained 
the phrase “such remand shall be immediately carried into execution,” which Con-
gress subsequently deleted from the law in 1949.  Ex parte Pa. Co., 137 U.S. 451, 
453–54 (1890); ch. 139, 63 Stat. 89, 102 (1949).  Neither should influence the choice 
of comparative dates, however.  The addition and deletion of context-specific statuto-
ry exemptions is immaterial to the question of deceptively-induced remands, and can 
offer no illumination on that issue.  The excision of the “immediately carried into 
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there a true clash of laws at issue here, the resolution of that clash by tradi-
tional last-in-time principles of statutory construction would have Section 
1447(d) give way to the federal courts’ Rules-enshrined authority to vacate an 
order procured by fraud. 
Second, our law is steeped in principles embodying the notion that 
courts do not reward misbehavior by those appearing before them.  Both the 
inherent power and Rule-based doctrine of fraud-on-the-court is just one ex-
ample.  Other examples are legion.  The doctrine of judicial estoppel is un-
derstood as protecting “the integrity of the judicial process” by denying a 
prize to those who are “playing fast and loose with the courts to suit the exi-
gencies of self-interest.”290  Both unjust enrichment and constructive trust 
endeavor to deprive one from retaining some benefit when doing so would be 
inequitable.291  The unclean hands maxim teaches similarly, that no one ought 
to “be permitted to found any claim upon his own inequity or take advantage 
of his own wrong.”292  The goal of the remedy of disgorgement is generally 
“to deprive the wrongdoer of his ill-gotten gain” and “to deter others” from 
similar law-breaking.293  The exclusionary rule in criminal law “tells police 
that if they obtain evidence illegally, they will not ordinarily be allowed to 
use it against the suspect they are after.”294  This pervasive judicial aversion 
against being an unwilling accomplice to injustice is grounded in bedrock 
principles of fundamental equity and encompasses the “equitable tradition of 
vacatur.”295  Section 1447(d)’s no-review directive should be construed in a 
 
execution” language did not substantively alter the no-review directive.  See 
Thermtron Prods., Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336, 343 (1976) (no-review “has 
been the established rule . . . stretching back to 1887”); In re Lowe, 102 F.3d 731, 734 
(4th Cir. 1996) (“The general rule prohibiting review of remand orders has been a part 
of American jurisprudence for at least a century.”).  If relevant for any purpose, it 
would only tend to soften the absolutism of Congress’s insistence on no remand re-
views.  Cf. United States v. Rice, 327 U.S. 742, 751 (1946) (emphasizing how the 
“coupl[ing]” presence of the “immediately carried into execution” phrase contributes 
to making the no-review directive “no longer open to doubt”); Ex parte Pa. Co., 137 
U.S. at 454 (commenting that “the use of the words, ‘such remand shall be immedi-
ately carried into execution,’ in addition to the prohibition of appeal and writ of error, 
is strongly indicative of an intent to suppress further prolongation of the controversy 
by whatever process.”). 
 290. See In re Coastal Plains, Inc., 179 F.3d 197, 205 (5th Cir. 1999) (quoting 
Brandon v. Interfirst Corp., 858 F.2d 266, 268 (5th Cir. 1988)). 
 291. See Counihan v. Allstate Ins. Co., 194 F.3d 357, 361 (2d Cir. 1999). 
 292. See R.H. Stearns Co. v. United States, 291 U.S. 54, 61–62 (1934). 
 293. See SEC v. Teo, 746 F.3d 90, 104–05 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting SEC v. Whit-
temore, 659 F.3d 1, 11 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2011)). 
 294. United States v. Swift, 220 F.3d 502, 506–07 (7th Cir. 2000). 
 295. See U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall P’ship, 513 U.S. 18, 25 (1994) 
(noting “equitable tradition of vacatur” vested in appellate courts by statute).  It may 
well be that the American tradition of “appeal” found its roots in equity, and as such, 
our whole appellate structure might be understood to represent Congress’s equitable 
judgment on the appropriate scope of that reviewing opportunity.  See generally Mary 
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manner that harmonizes with, not collides against, those core building blocks 
of justice.296  The legislature’s selection of the definitionally imprecise term 
“reviewable” only reinforces this construction.297 
Both of these last two tools – clash of laws and law harmonization – 
align toward the same conclusion.  In the search for meaning in Congress’s 
no-review directive, the best symmetry among ordinary meaning, perceived 
“will of the Legislature,” existing interpretative case law, fraud-on-the-court 
principles, and classical statutory construction tools is produced by the con-
clusion that “review” in Section 1447(d) means something more than “can-
cel,” “annul,” or “rescind.”  A “re-view” necessarily presupposes a first view, 
one that was actually a bona fide, legitimate look.  If that first view was cor-
rupted – by force, duress, coercion, bribery, forgery, or deception – then no 
true first view ever took place.  When the judicial process has been comman-
deered, the judiciary retains its ancient, remedial power to undo the mischief.  
The legitimacy of, and broad public acquiescence in, the judicial process de-
pends inexorably on confidence that the litigation process works fairly.298  
 
Sarah Bilder, The Origin of the Appeal in America, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 913 (1997).  But 
even if the drafters of Section 1447(d) were mindful of the appeal’s historical ground-
ing in equity, the law they wrote foreclosed only “review” of remand grants, which 
still leaves unresolved the threshold question of what “review” actually encompasses. 
 296. See United States v. Rodgers, 461 U.S. 677, 716 n.5 (1983) (Blackmun, J., 
dissenting) (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 418 (1976)) (“[D]espite the 
absolute language of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Court has concluded that ‘§ 1983 is to be 
read in harmony with general principles of tort immunities and defenses rather than in 
derogation of them.’”).  See also Miller v. Mylan Inc., 741 F.3d 674, 678 (6th Cir. 
2014) (quoting Badaracco v. Comm’r, 464 U.S. 386, 403 n.3 (1984) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting)) (“It is axiomatic that statutes in derogation of the common law should be 
narrowly construed.”); Robert C. Herd & Co. v. Krawill Mach. Corp., 359 U.S. 297, 
304 (1959) (“Any such rule of law, being in derogation of the common law, must be 
strictly construed . . . .”). 
 297. See Robert C. Herd & Co. v. Krawill Mach. Corp., 359 U.S. 297, 304 (1959) 
(advising that no statute should “be construed as making any innovation upon the 
common law which it does not fairly express’”).  See generally ANTONIN SCALIA & 
BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 318 
(2012) (“[S]tatutes will not be interpreted as changing the common law unless they 
effect the change with clarity.”). 
 298. See, e.g., CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES Canon 1 (“An 
independent and honorable judiciary is indispensable to justice in our society.”); id. at 
Commentary (“Deference to the judgments and rulings of courts depends on public 
confidence in the integrity and independence of judges.”); id. at Canon 2 (“A judge 
should respect and comply with the law and should act at all times in a manner that 
promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.”); id. at 
Canon 2A, Commentary (“Public confidence in the judiciary is eroded by irresponsi-
ble or improper conduct by judges.”).  See also Turner v. Pleasant, 663 F.3d 770, 777 
(5th Cir. 2011) (“This court, like the public at large, relies on the integrity and hones-
ty of the district judges.  We presume judges to be honest.”).  See generally Solimine, 
supra note 2, at 323 (footnotes omitted) (“Appellate review is generally conceded to 
serve numerous salutary values, from both a litigant-oriented perspective (e.g., em-
47
Janssen: Remands by Deception
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2016
122 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81 
Thus, in circumstances where a district judge is induced by a party’s decep-
tion into entering a remand order, that remand should remain subject to vaca-
tur (not “review”) when doing so is necessary to safeguard the integrity of the 
federal court and its judicial processes. 
What, then, becomes the fate of the remand motion in the post-vacation 
litigation?  If the vacated remand order is not a “review,” would the later re-
placement ruling on the now suddenly re-pending motion for remand consti-
tute a forbidden “review”?  Is the very act of issuing a “replacement” remand 
ruling, one that substitutes for the original, a “re-examination” (and, thus, a 
“review”)?  Or would the fact that the original deceptively-induced remand 
ruling was vacated (that is, annulled, canceled, rescinded) mean, like a Casi-
no Royale Bond reboot, that history has been expunged, that no remand order 
had ever been entered, and that the trial judge writes afresh on a virgin slate? 
Our analysis of fraud-on-the-court supplies a ready answer.  Because the 
deceptive inducement prevented a true first “view” by the federal deci-
sionmaker, and because only “re-views” are barred, the district judge is per-
mitted – informed by the true facts – to render a decision on the newly re-
pending motion to remand.  That ruling, be it correct or in error, is the first 
“view” and, once entered, then unreviewable. 
IV.  IMPACT OF A CONSTRUCTION THAT PERMITS VACATUR FOR 
FRAUD 
Back in Richmond, Judge Davis penned a withering dissent after his en 
banc colleagues in Barlow recognized a vacatur right for deceptively-induced 
remands.299  He offered this explanation for why removal-and-remand fights 
have been chippy (or, to borrow his phrase, “recurring, decades-old, hand-to-
hand combat”): “Defendants (virtually) always want to be in federal court 
whenever they can,” because, from their perspective, discovery is better, 
summary judgment is better, jury pools are better; “[o]n the other hand, most 
plaintiffs . . . (and, more importantly, plaintiffs’ counsel) prefer state court 
over federal court for the very obverse of the above-listed factors.”300  As our 
survey through removal and remand has shown, perhaps a bit more can be 
added to Judge Davis’s lists.  To defendants, nervous to avoid being “ho-
mered,” a federal forum is often perceived as a last, lonely oasis of neutrality, 
staffed with even-handed, nonpartisan decisionmakers (harken, the Balti-
more/Indianapolis Colts).301  To plaintiffs, anxious to ensure a welcoming 
setting to hear their claims, a flight away from a state forum is often seen as 
 
powering litigants, having their day in court) and a systemic perspective (e.g., diffus-
ing power, increasing rationality and consistency, ensuring adequate law develop-
ment, providing for error correction).”). 
 299. See Barlow v. Colgate Palmolive Co., 772 F.3d 1001 (4th Cir. 2014). 
 300. Id. at 1015–16 (Davis, J., dissenting).  All of this, the dissent reassures the 
reader, is not a divulging of “palace secrets.”  Id. at 1016. 
 301. See supra Part II.A. 
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an antiquated delaying tactic grounded on post-colonial suppositions that may 
have had some modest basis in fact back in the eighteenth century but have 
no place over the bridge in the twenty-first century. 
In these battles, every advantage is prized.  A right to vacate deceptive-
ly-induced remands adds to the arsenal to be sure.  Judge Davis feared an 
onslaught of strategizing pretrial mischief: “It is now the law of the Fourth 
Circuit that a Rule 60(b)(3) motion must be entertained by every district 
judge in the circuit in any remanded case, and the district judge is required to 
write a convincing opinion showing why ‘vacatur’ of the remand order is 
appropriate.”302  So distinguished a jurist’s opinion should not be lightly dis-
counted.  But there remains formidable counterweights that are likely to miti-
gate overuse and misuse of such a vacatur power. 
First, nothing in this type of vacatur licenses error-correction.  Litigants 
who feel that they have been unmeritoriously remanded still have no re-
course.  Section 1447(d) has vaulted shut that door and sealed it remains.  A 
federal judge’s order remanding a removed case back to state court is still 
“not reviewable on appeal [o]r otherwise”303 beyond the limited statutory 
exemptions and judicial exclusions that already exist,304 regardless of how 
unmistakable, egregious, or horrifyingly clear the error.305 
Second, there is no new body of interpretive law to devise in effectuat-
ing this right of vacatur.  It already exists and has for a great many years.  The 
type of misconduct that will qualify as a fraud-on-the-court has long been 
explored both as an inherently vesting judicial power and, since 1948, in the 
context of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.306  That body of law is now 
well developed and constitutes the great reservoir of precedential authority 
that will serve as the check on any request for a remand vacatur.  Its long 
stability also adds grounding and predictability to the elements of proof that 
must define such vacatur. 
Third, the burden on the party claiming a right to such vacatur is formi-
dable.307  It ordinarily requires proof of misconduct by an officer of the court 
(such as an attorney)308 that is intentionally or recklessly false, directed at 
“the judicial machinery itself,” and actually succeeds in deceiving the tribu-
 
 302. Barlow, 772 F.3d at 1017 (Davis, J., dissenting). 
 303. See Three J Farms, Inc. v. Alton Box Bd. Co., 609 F.2d 112, 115 (4th Cir. 
1979) (“Unquestionably, the statute not only forecloses appellate review, but also bars 
reconsideration of such an order by the district court.”). 
 304. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (2012).  See supra notes 114–19 and accompanying 
text. 
 305. See supra notes 82–87 and accompanying text. 
 306. See generally WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 233, at §§ 2860, 2868–70. 
 307. See Turner v. Pleasant, 663 F.3d 770, 777 (5th Cir. 2011) (“Simple fraud is 
insufficient. . . .  Rather, the fraud alleged must be of a greater order of magnitude.”). 
 308. See NC-DSH, Inc. v. Garner, 218 P.3d 853, 858–59 (Nev. 2009) (stating 
fraud perpetrated by attorney serving as officer of the court can trigger fraud-on-the-
court). 
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nal.309  The movant must also carry its proof by clear and convincing evi-
dence.310 
Fourth, the constellation of facts and compelling weight of evidence that 
will support a successful vacatur motion is likely to be rare.  Consider that the 
first case to adopt a deceptively-induced remand right to vacatur came in late 
2014, more than a century and a quarter after Congress first installed the no-
review directive.311  And even there, with facts so troubling that it prompted 
the state court judge on remand to exasperate in disbelief (“I can’t believe 
you actually told [two federal judges] one thing and tell me another.”),312 the 
federal district judge was still unconvinced that even a sanctionable event had 
occurred, let alone a “defiling” fraud-on-the-court.313  On appeal, the en banc 
Fourth Circuit found no particular substantive error with the district judge’s 
conclusions, only that they were unsupported by specific findings.314  And 
back in the district court, post appeal, a newly assigned presiding district 
judge ruled against vacatur, following a period of extensive briefing.315  Col-
gate had insisted that vacatur-qualifying bad faith was shown by Plaintiffs’ 
oral argument concession that these were “one-defendant case[s]” and rein-
forced by Plaintiffs’ decision to not pursue discovery against and, indeed, to 
later voluntarily dismiss the diversity-destroying in-state defendants.316  Nev-
ertheless, the trial judge reasoned that while Plaintiffs’ subjective intent to 
press (or not press) claims against the diversity-destroying in-state defendants 
 
 309. See, e.g., United States v. Estate of Stonehill, 660 F.3d 415, 444 (9th Cir. 
2011); Johnson v. Bell, 605 F.3d 333, 339 (6th Cir. 2010).  See generally WRIGHT ET 
AL., supra note 233, at 411–15. 
 310. See Estate of Stonehill, 660 F.3d at 444; Booker v. Dugger, 825 F.2d 281, 
283–84 (11th Cir. 1987). 
 311. See generally Barlow v. Colgate Palmolive Co., 772 F.3d 1001 (4th Cir. 
2014). 
 312. Id. at 1006. 
 313. Order of the Hon. William M. Nickerson dated June 26, 2013, in Barlow v. 
John Crane-Houdaille, Inc., No. WMN-12-1780 (D. Md.), Joint Appendix, supra note 
146, at 1108 (“The statements of Plaintiffs’ counsel in proceedings in this Court and 
the state court relating to the possible implication of third party, non-diverse, defend-
ants appear to be in sharp conflict.  While this is troubling, the Court recognizes that 
those statements are attributable to different attorneys in markedly different litigation 
contexts.  In these particular circumstances, this Court is not convinced that counsel’s 
conduct is sanctionable.”). 
 314. Barlow, 772 F.3d at 1012–13 (reasoning that because “the lower court, famil-
iar with the facts and parties, is better suited to make this determination,” the en banc 
court was returning the matter to the trial judge “to make specific findings—
supported by cogent reasoning—on whether Plaintiffs engaged in misconduct while 
in federal court,” and directing the trial judge to so by providing “more analysis than 
that included in the orders’ dicta, which would be too perfunctory to merit meaningful 
review”). 
 315. Barlow v. John Crane-Houdaille, Inc., No. WDQ-12-1780, 2015 BL 334332 
(D. Md. Oct. 8, 2015). 
 316. Id. at *8. 
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was indeed a relevant consideration,317 the evidence Colgate had mustered 
failed to dispel the conclusion that Plaintiffs possessed enough of a claim 
against those defendants to justify a remand.318 Thus, even in the first ever 
case of deceptively-induced remand vacatur to percolate up to the courts of 
appeals, the practical impact of the onerous burden awaiting any such vaca-
tur-aspiring fraud-on-the-court motion was on clear display. 
All of these factors should restrain the making of loose or idle vacatur 
requests, and the road that awaits any such movant is little short of suffocat-
ing.  Moreover, the volume of cases impacted potentially by deceptively-
induced vacaturs is modest by any measure.319 Clearly, this experience is no 
clarion call for strategic vacatur motion filings.   
For certain, one consequence of such vacaturs cannot be gainsaid.  Any-
time “we pull a remanded case back into the federal courts, we delay the pro-
gress of justice and give parties a tool and an incentive to engage in dilatory 
tactics.”320  A deceptively-induced remand vacatur will risk that.  The “hand-
to-hand combat” in such a vacatur context is almost certain to be delaying 
and costly, and an abrupt return to a federal court’s already crowded docket 
would probably only add further delay.  The Barlow litigation is telling.  It 
began in 2012, and not until autumn 2015 was there final closure on the 
threshold question of what tribunal should properly hear the merits.321 
 
 317. Id. at *14 (footnotes omitted) (holding that “a removing defendant may de-
feat remand by showing that the plaintiffs cannot succeed against the resident defend-
ants, or by showing that the plaintiffs never intended to”). 
 318. Id. at *11–12 (“That the Plaintiffs’ counsel decided that it aided their clients 
to present a different argument to the Circuit Court on a different matter (consolida-
tion) does not mean that the Maryland defendants were fraudulently joined.”).  See 
also id. at *14 (“Colgate has not provided--nor has the Court found--authority for the 
proposition that a plaintiff’s post-remand voluntary dismissal of resident defendants--
or decision not to pursue discovery--sufficiently shows a lack of good faith intent to 
obtain a judgment for the purpose of establishing a meritorious claim to a federal 
forum.”).  To rule otherwise, wrote the trial judge, would encourage remand vacatur 
motions “every time a plaintiff decides to dismiss a diversity jurisdiction-defeating 
defendant from state litigation.”  Id. 
 319. See Solimine, supra note 2, at 325 (noting that remanded cases occupy “less 
than two percent” of the federal courts’ civil docket). 
 320. Aquamar S.A. v. Del Monte Fresh Produce N.A., Inc., 179 F.3d 1279, 1289 
(11th Cir. 1999).  Cf. Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust, 547 U.S. 633, 640 (2006) (quot-
ing United States v. Rice, 327 U.S. 742, 751 (1946)) (recounting “nearly three years 
of jurisdictional advocacy” on the scope of Section 1447(d)’s prohibition as “con-
firm[ing] the congressional wisdom” of endeavoring to avoid “‘prolonged litigation of 
questions of jurisdiction of the district court to which the cause is removed’”). 
 321. The soundness of Plaintiffs’ exposure theory remains in its infancy as this 
Article goes to press.  In what appears to be the first-ever resolution of a Cashmere 
Bouquet exposure claim, Colgate settled in Spring 2015 a personal injury lawsuit 
filed by a California couple who had alleged mesothelioma from Cashmere Bouquet 
exposure; days earlier, a Los Angeles jury had returned a multi-million dollar verdict 
in the couple’s favor.  See Myron Levin, Colgate-Palmolive Settles Talc-Asbestos 
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But what is gained by allowing such vacaturs surely overbalances the 
collateral delay, cost, and federalism impacts – the federal court’s ability to 
rectify a corruption of its processes.  In truth, the judicial system can accept 
nothing less.  If a litigant can deliberately, mischievously misstate (or outright 
concoct) facts to defeat removal and compel remand, by inducing a district 
judge to act on an invented factual record, a clear injustice is perpetrated if 
the miscreant can also invoke Congress’s no-review directive to evade mean-
ingful remediation.  What would suffer is not just an individual litigant’s 
rights, but the integrity and legitimacy of the justice system writ large.  As 
this analysis has shown, such a result is commanded neither by the language 
of the statute nor by its legislative purpose.  It defies good sense to believe 
Congress envisioned tolerating such a maneuver when it enacted the no-
review prohibition, but in any event, such an incredulous statute is not the one 
it wrote.  A vacatur to rescind a remand order that has been deceptively in-
duced is not a “review” forbidden by Congress.  Ergo, it is not proscribed. 
CONCLUSION 
Removal is, and has always been, about fairness.  It is Congress’s 
recognition that a change in decisional tribunal may be prudent (or critical) in 
securing fundamental justice and in maintaining confidence in, and the per-
ceived legitimacy of, federal courts.  When removal is defeated through a 
deliberate, calculated misrepresentation designed to deceive the tribunal, 
Congress’s purpose is not served nor is the legitimacy of the judicial process 
protected.  Because a vacatur of a deceptively-induced remand order is not a 
“review” proscribed by law, courts retain their longstanding, historic authori-
ty to protect against such mischief. 
 
 
Case, Dismisses Link to Cancer, MIAMI HERALD (May 1, 2015), http://www.miami
herald.com/news/nation-world/national/article19997730.html.  Plaintiffs had claimed 
that their cosmetic talc was contaminated with asbestos fibers from having been 
mined from a deposit interlaced with asbestos.  See id.  In a related context, a seventy-
two million dollar verdict was returned in a general talcum powder case by a Missouri 
jury in early Spring 2016.  See Johnson & Johnson to Pay $72m in Case Linking 
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